Reuters’ Hegseth Story: The Pentagon Has a Leak!
- lhpgop
- May 7
- 4 min read

As of early May 2025, a seemingly surgical leak to Reuters suggests that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth may have “misread” President Trump’s order to pause the shipment of certain U.S. armaments to Ukraine. On its face, this might seem like a routine bureaucratic stumble — an administrative hiccup in the fog of foreign policy. But in context, and with the peculiar level of detail provided to the press, this is far more likely to be a case of deliberate sabotage from within the Department of Defense.
This isn’t just about a leaked memo or an anonymous quote — it’s a political strike wrapped in the language of procedure. And once again, it appears that entrenched forces inside the Pentagon are telegraphing their defiance of a President they neither trust nor serve in good faith.
A Tailor-Made Leak
Reuters, a reliable amplifier of establishment narratives, published the story with suspicious precision: a high-level miscommunication, detailed timelines, source-heavy attributions, and subtle framing that implies Hegseth is either incompetent or out of the loop.
How did they get this information? Unless the Secretary of Defense or the President’s inner circle is directly feeding intelligence to adversarial media (unlikely), the only plausible source is senior military staff or career civilian officialsembedded deep within the Pentagon’s bureaucracy. This follows a familiar playbook:
Undermine the civilian head (Hegseth) with questions of competency;
Paint the Trump administration as chaotic in its foreign policy execution;
Signal to allies in the press and Congress that the Pentagon remains an independent power base, immune to political disruption.
A History of Defiance
This isn’t new. During Trump’s first term, the Pentagon and intelligence community:
Slow-walked his orders to withdraw from Syria and Afghanistan;
Leaked classified details surrounding Ukraine military aid (leading to Impeachment I);
Allowed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley to freelance foreign diplomacy with China behind the President’s back;
Fostered a media-friendly network of anonymous insiders who routinely contradicted Trump-era national security priorities.
In all of these cases, the pattern was the same: stall, leak, reframe, undermine.
The Civil-Military Divide Deepens
Pete Hegseth, a Trump loyalist and vocal advocate for enlisted personnel over brass elites, represents a direct threat to the Pentagon’s self-preserving aristocracy. His appointment was an unmistakable signal: civilian control is back — and this time it’s personal.
That’s why this leak is not just about policy — it’s a warning shot. The military’s upper echelons, especially career officers and civilian appointees who thrived under the Obama-Biden security doctrine, may be preparing to close ranksagainst the administration in a shadow resistance effort.
If this is true, Trump’s team will need to anticipate and neutralize bureaucratic guerrilla warfare in the form of:
Information operations via press leaks,
Delay or noncompliance with executive orders,
Internal sabotage of military drawdowns or foreign policy recalibrations,
Whisper campaigns against key Trump appointees (Hegseth, Ric Grenell, others).
Where to Look for the Next Leak
The President and his Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) should take a hard look at the following high-risk nodes of resistance:
Joint Chiefs of Staff — especially retired Chairman Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., a Biden-era appointee with close NATO ties.
Combatant Commands — particularly EUCOM and CENTCOM, which wield significant autonomous authority and global relationships.
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy — historically the ideological engine room of Pentagon foreign policy.
Deputy Undersecretaries for Strategy & Intel — embedded crossover points between DOD and CIA/State Department.
General Counsel and Public Affairs Divisions — where internal policy becomes external narrative.
Additionally, anyone with deep ties to Brookings, RAND, CSIS, or the Atlantic Council must be viewed as potential counter-policy actors operating within the walls of the Pentagon.
A Bureaucracy at War With Itself
If this trend continues, the Trump administration may be forced to consider sweeping purges of defense leadership — not based on political vendettas, but to reassert constitutional civilian control. After all, the President doesn’t need a Pentagon that acts like a separate branch of government.
This latest leak is not a footnote. It’s a flare on the horizon — signaling that a war for control of American foreign policy is once again underway. This time, the administration must not underestimate its enemies within.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are defined under U.S. federal law, specifically 10 U.S. Code § 155 and related sections in Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed Forces). Their legal role is advisory, not command. Here’s a breakdown of their formal functions:
🛡️ Legal Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
🔹 1. Advisory Authority (Not Operational Command)
10 U.S. Code § 155(b) states:
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.”
This means they are advisers only. They do not exercise command authority over combatant forces. That authority is explicitly reserved for:
The President (as Commander-in-Chief),
The Secretary of Defense, and
Combatant Commanders (per 10 U.S. Code § 162).
🔹 2. Composition (10 U.S. Code § 151)
The JCS includes:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS),
Vice Chairman,
Chiefs of each service:
Army (CSA),
Navy (CNO),
Air Force (CSAF),
Marine Corps (CMC),
Space Force (CSF),
National Guard Bureau (Chief).
🔹 3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) – Key Role
Designated as the primary military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense.
Oversees meetings and coordination but does not command troops.
10 U.S. Code § 153 details the CJCS responsibilities:
Strategic planning,
Force development advice,
Assessment of military requirements,
Integration of service branches into a joint warfighting doctrine.
🧾 Summary of Limitations:
Function | Authority? | Source of Law |
Commanding forces | ❌ No | 10 U.S.C. § 162 (SecDef/President only) |
Advising the President | ✅ Yes | 10 U.S.C. § 155(b) |
Developing strategy | ✅ Yes | 10 U.S.C. § 153 |
Issuing orders to COCOMs | ❌ No | Orders flow through SecDef |
Budgeting or deployment | ❌ Limited | Informal influence only |
⚠️ Important Legal Doctrine:
Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
This Act clarified that operational military command flows directly from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commanders.
The Joint Chiefs were deliberately made non-command entities to prevent military overreach or insubordination.
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