Venezuela at the Crossroads. Who will "run the show"
- lhpgop
- 3 hours ago
- 6 min read
FOR THE US TO SUCCEED IN VENEZUELA IT WILL NEED A POWERFUL COALITION NOT A "ONE MAN RULE" SITUATION
Political Players, Power Retention, Legal Exposure, and the Architecture of a Viable Transition
Executive Summary
Venezuela’s transition away from Nicolás Maduro’s rule—whether abrupt or negotiated—cannot succeed if it is framed as the elevation of a single opposition figure or the wholesale purge of existing state capacity. The country’s reality is institutional capture, fragmented legitimacy, and overlapping legal exposures. A successful transition must therefore balance constitutional legitimacy, popular mobilization, institutional continuity, and credible accountability.
This paper identifies:
The principal political players likely to appear in, or influence, a transitional authority;
Which Maduro-era figures still retain coercive or administrative power;
Which individuals face credible risk of prosecution under U.S. or international law;
A phased framework for a transition that avoids state collapse while restoring legitimacy.
I. The Opposition Side: Who Is There—and Why
Edmundo González Urrutia
Why he matters:González functions as a legal-constitutional anchor. He was internationally recognized by the U.S. and several allies as the winner of Venezuela’s disputed 2024 election. In any transition seeking international legitimacy, his inclusion is not optional—it is structural.
How he fits:
Provides constitutional continuity without radical rhetoric.
Acceptable to foreign governments, multilateral lenders, and technocratic ministries.
Lacks an independent mass movement, which paradoxically makes him safer as a unifying figurehead rather than a factional leader.
Risk:Without support from mobilized opposition forces, he cannot govern alone.
María Corina Machado
Why she matters:Machado is the most effective mobilizer of anti-regime sentiment inside Venezuela. She commands loyalty, courage capital, and international media attention.
Why she cannot be the sole beacon:
She does not demonstrably command a national governing majority on her own.
Her hard-line posture alarms regime-embedded institutions whose cooperation is necessary to prevent chaos.
Over-personalization around Machado creates a “winner-take-all” dynamic that incentivizes sabotage.
How she fits:
Essential member of a collective executive or political council.
Best placed overseeing political reform, civic mobilization, and anti-corruption agenda-setting—not sole executive power.
Juan Guaidó
Why he still appears in discussions:Guaidó retains diaspora influence, particularly in Miami, and institutional memory regarding frozen assets and international legal strategies.
Why his role is limited:
His interim presidency lost momentum due to lack of domestic enforcement power.
Venezuelans inside the country largely view him as a past phase, not a future executive.
How he fits:
Advisory or external diplomatic role; not central to day-to-day governance.
II. Maduro-Era Power Holders: Who Still Matters
Delcy Rodríguez
Current leverage:Rodríguez represents institutional continuity—courts, ministries, and security coordination. She is sanctioned internationally but not currently under U.S. criminal indictment.
Why she matters in transition math:
She controls administrative levers necessary to keep the state functioning in the short term.
Removing her immediately without a replacement risks bureaucratic paralysis.
Why her inclusion is dangerous:
Sanctions and corruption allegations severely damage legitimacy.
Her presence must be time-limited, conditional, and supervised.
Jorge Rodríguez
Role:A behind-the-scenes negotiator and regime tactician.
Transition relevance:
Useful only as an interlocutor to unwind regime resistance.
Not a credible public figure in a democratic transition.
Vladimir Padrino López
Why he matters:No transition survives without military neutrality. Padrino López has historically positioned himself as the guarantor of institutional stability.
Risk:
Sanctioned by the U.S.
His inclusion signals continuity, not rupture.
How he fits:
Temporary security guarantor under civilian oversight; not a political leader.
III. Figures with High Prosecution Risk (Likely Excluded)
Nicolás Maduro
Facing U.S. federal narco-terrorism charges.
No pathway into any legitimate transitional authority.
Cilia Flores
Deep legal exposure, including family narcotics cases.
Excluded entirely from governance.
Diosdado Cabello
Repeatedly named in U.S. allegations regarding the Cartel of the Suns.
His inclusion would collapse international recognition overnight.
Tareck El Aissami
Sanctioned for narcotics trafficking and corruption.
Prime candidate for prosecution, not negotiation.
Other Sanctioned but Lesser-Known Regime Figures
Sanctions lists (pre-2026) included:
Tarek William Saab (Ombudsman / human rights critic; sanctioned for undermining rule of law).
Néstor Reverol (former Interior Minister; previously indicted under U.S. law).
Freddy Bernal (head of CLAP food program; accused of aiding narcotics trafficking under U.S. law).
Maikel Moreno, Adán Chávez, Iris Varela, among others — all on sanctions lists for corruption, electoral manipulation, or repression. Wikipedia
The coalition question: who must be included vs excluded
Must be included (or represented)
González Urrutia (legitimacy anchor) TIME+1
Machado’s bloc (mobilization + moral authority) TIME+1
A second opposition pole (to avoid single-person “beacon” politics)
Technocrats (central bank, health, grid, ports)
Civil society/human-rights (to prevent emergency rule abuses, especially amid reported crackdowns) Financial Times
Generally excluded from governing roles (but can negotiate exit terms)
hardline security actors and sanctioned individuals unless they accept binding oversight, asset disclosure, and a clear exit timetable.
“Pass/fail” tests in the first 14 days
If a transitional committee can’t do these, it’s not real:
Release political prisoners / end journalist detentions Financial Times
Publish an election calendar
Freeze discretionary spending + open books on PDVSA cashflow
Disarm or sideline colectivos from policing Financial Times
Invite credible international monitoring
Transitional framework for Venezuela
Core design principle
Separate “who keeps order tomorrow” from “who gets democratic legitimacy next.”That means: a short, tightly-scoped Stabilization Authority → quickly replaced by a Democratic Transition Authority anchored in elections and constitutional legitimacy.
Phase 0 (first 72 hours): Stabilize without legitimizing repression
Objective: prevent civil conflict + stop mass reprisals + keep services running.
Non-negotiables (“Day 1 Decree Packet”)
General amnesty for peaceful political activity + immediate end to arbitrary detentions; allow international monitors access to prisons. (This is directly responsive to reports of crackdowns and detentions.) Financial Times
Rules of engagement for security forces: ban colectivos from policing; centralized command responsibility. Financial Times
Financial continuity order: keep central bank/payment rails operating; freeze discretionary ministry spending pending audit.
Deliverable: a single-page “National Continuity + Non-Reprisal” order signed by whoever is actually controlling the state apparatus.
Phase 1 (0–30 days): National Stabilization Authority (NSA)
Objective: keep the country functioning while building a credible path to a legitimate government.
A. Structure (small, enforceable, hard to capture)
1) Interim Executive Council (7 seats)
2 seats: constitutional legitimacy bloc (González Urrutia team is the obvious anchor because of international recognition claims). TIME+1
2 seats: opposition political leadership bloc (Machado’s movement + another major opposition pole to avoid “Machado-only” optics). TIME+1
2 seats: institutional continuity bloc (non-indicted, vetted career officials from central bank/health/energy; not political firebrands).
1 seat: civil society/human-rights bloc (e.g., a respected Venezuelan rights attorney/NGO leader with credibility).
2) Security Oversight Board (3 seats)
chaired by a neutral technocrat + 2 members appointed by (a) opposition bloc and (b) institutional bloc.
job: demobilize irregulars; chain-of-command audit; approve senior security appointments.
3) Public Finance Control Board (5 seats)
controls PDVSA cashflow and ministry procurement until audited; includes international anti-corruption assistance.
B. Eligibility rules (how you prevent “criminal continuity”)
Anyone is ineligible for NSA roles if they are:
under U.S./EU/Canada sanctions for corruption/human-rights abuses, or
credibly implicated in major narcotics/terror finance cases, or
commanded forces implicated in mass repression without agreeing to oversight and accountability processes.
This is the clean way to address the reality that Delcy Rodríguez is in the chair right now Reuters+1 without letting the “interim” become a permanent shield.
Phase 2 (30–180 days): Democratic Transition Authority (DTA)
Objective: transfer legitimacy from “who controls the ministries” to “who wins a verified vote.”
A. Elections roadmap (fast, but real)
Appoint an independent electoral commission with international technical support (OAS/EU/UN-style observation architecture).
Reopen voter rolls + diaspora voting mechanism (huge legitimacy lever).
Schedule presidential + legislative elections with a fixed date window (e.g., 120–180 days), unless security conditions objectively prevent it (monitored).
B. Transitional justice framework (prevents bloodletting and prevents impunity)
Truth + accountability track for major crimes (torture, killings, massive corruption).
Conditional leniency for lower-level officials who cooperate, return stolen assets, and accept bans from office.This is how you peel the bureaucracy away from hardliners.
Phase 3 (180 days–2 years): Reconstruction + normalization
Objective: restore basic living standards + rebuild institutions so the next crisis doesn’t recreate chavismo-without-Maduro.
A. “Marshall plan” principles (without occupation language)
cash tied to milestones: electricity uptime, hospital supply chain, food distribution transparency, anti-corruption procurement, judicial reforms.
oil infrastructure rehab with strict revenue escrow + public reporting (this has been floated in U.S. political messaging about rebuilding). Reuters