Venezuela Status Report (as of Feb 11, 2026)

FLAG OF VENEZUELA.

Purpose: “Where we are now,” measured against the transition ideas we’ve discussed (e.g., a neutral board of governors, credible elections, avoiding high-risk diaspora voting shortcuts, and how this could affect return migration).

1) Executive snapshot — where the U.S. State Department says we are

State’s stated approach is phased, not deadline-driven: stabilize → recover (oil/economy) → transition. That framing strongly suggests the U.S. is not publicly committing to a tight “X days to elections” calendar right now.

2) Oil sector: “pumps firing up” and whether companies are in-country

What you’re seeing is consistent with a real ramp-up in sanctioned-but-authorized energy activity:

• Venezuela state of nation

  OFAC has issued broad authorizations (general licenses) to facilitate oil/gas activity under strict conditions(including how money flows and who is excluded).

• Reporting indicates companies are actively pursuing permissions for projects tied to Venezuela and adjacent cross-border resources (e.g., gas development requiring OFAC authorization).

• There are also explicit geopolitical “exclusion” signals (e.g., limits on certain participation), which matters because it shapes who can operate and how quickly capacity can come back.

Bottom line: yes—oil activity is being restarted, and the policy architecture increasingly looks like it’s designed to unlock production + exports while controlling who profits, and how.

3) Governance: the “board of governors” concept vs. what’s visible now

From the public record, the U.S. message is “transition later”—after stabilization and an oil/economic recovery phase. That is not the same thing as immediately installing a neutral, technocratic interim board (your “board of governors” concept) with a fast electoral clock.

Why that matters: a neutral interim board is typically proposed to (a) reduce retaliation/chaos, (b) de-politicize basic services, (c) create credible election administration. The State framing implies the U.S. is prioritizing order + economic restoration first, then governance redesign.

4) Your 180-day estimate: where it stands now

If we anchor your estimate to ~180 days from early January 2026, that points to late June 2026.

What we can say from current U.S. signaling:

• The public plan is phased and does not publish an election date.

• The strongest visible “deliverables” the U.S. is pushing right now are energy licensing + recovery mechanics, not an election calendar.

Assessment: based on the stated U.S. sequence, June 2026 looks optimistic unless the U.S. and Venezuelan stakeholders unveil (soon) a concrete election roadmap with election administration reforms.

5) Diaspora voting in the first election — addressing your concern directly

Your worry is basically: high-stakes election + disrupted institutions + large diaspora = high fraud/contestation risk.

A practical, defensible approach (that matches your instinct) is:

A. Don’t start with “remote voting from abroad” as the core mechanism.Instead, make the first election legitimacy-maximizing:

• Rebuild/clean the voter roll inside Venezuela

• Transparent chain-of-custody

• Independent international observation

• Paper-based or auditable ballots

• Public reporting + independent tabulation audits

B. If diaspora voting is allowed at all in the first cycle, constrain it hard:

• In-person voting only at consulates/approved sites (not mass mail-in, not internet voting)

• Strong ID + biometric/registry cross-check to prevent double voting

• Same-day reconciliation of diaspora rolls against the domestic registry

• Full public auditing of diaspora turnout and precinct-level results

• Pilot scale (or phase-in) rather than opening it to every country immediately

This doesn’t “disenfranchise forever”—it just avoids turning the first post-crisis election into a legitimacy crisis.

6) Migration back to Venezuela: what changes and what doesn’t

Oil recovery can reduce outward migration pressure, but return migration depends on felt safety + rule of law + services, not oil headlines.

Here’s the realistic sequencing:

1. Security + basic services stabilize (electricity, food supply, policing)

2. Jobs + currency stability improve (oil helps here)

3. People begin to test-return (one household member first, then families)

4. Larger returns happen only after durable trust (courts, property rights, no political retaliation)

7) What to watch over the next 30–120 days

If you want a tight read on whether your “board → election” timeline is becoming real, watch for any of these specificsignals:

• A published transition framework (who governs, with what authority, and for how long)

• Announcement of an independent electoral authority and election law reforms

• Commitments for international election observation with access guarantees

• A clear decision on diaspora voting method (in-person vs remote)

• Energy revenues routed into transparent, audited public spending (a legitimacy builder)

Bottom line

• The U.S. State Department’s public posture is stabilization → oil/economic recovery → political transition, not “elections in 180 days.”

• Oil licensing is moving fast, and that will likely drive near-term actions and leverage.

• On diaspora voting, your caution is well-grounded: the safest first-election design is domestic legitimacy first, with in-person, tightly audited diaspora participation (or phased-in diaspora voting), not broad remote voting.