TRUMP'S DA LACKS AGGRESSION. BONDI NEEDS ONLY OPEN GARLAND'S PLAYBOOK.

AG PAM BONDI NEED ONLY LOOK BAACK A YEAR AT HOW "STATE ENEMIES" WERE HANDLED TO DO THE RIGHT THING.

Selective Enforcement and the Decline of Organizational AccountabilityWhy the Tools Used Under AG Merrick Garland Are Absent Under AG Pam Bondi

Executive Summary

From 2020 through 2024, the Department of Justice demonstrated that it possessed—and was willing to use—powerful legal tools to dismantle what it described as organized threats to public order. Conspiracy statutes, civil-rights enforcement, enterprise liability, and pretrial leverage were applied not merely to individual offenders, but to networks, associations, and loosely structured groups whose collective conduct was deemed destabilizing.

Today, by contrast, similarly organized actors who engage in coordinated disruption of religious services and intimidation of civilians face markedly narrower enforcement. This paper examines that disparity and asks why the authorities previously normalized under Attorney General Merrick Garland are not being applied under Attorney General Pam Bondito conduct that meets many of the same organizational criteria.

The issue is not the creation of new legal powers, but the uneven application of existing ones—and the long-term risks such selectivity poses to deterrence, legitimacy, and public order.

I. The Garland-Era Enforcement Model

Over the past five years, DOJ operationalized an enforcement framework characterized by four defining features:

1. Organizational Liability Over Individual ActsProsecutors increasingly emphasized conspiracy and association-in-fact theories, allowing liability to attach based on agreement, coordination, and continuity rather than isolated physical acts.

2. Civil-Rights Statutes as Primary WeaponsLongstanding provisions protecting voting, assembly, and access to public institutions were applied expansively, often in conjunction with conspiracy charges, to elevate exposure.

3. Escalatory Charging PracticesSuperseding indictments and charge stacking were used to increase pressure over time, particularly as cooperation opportunities emerged.

4. Network Disruption as an Express ObjectiveDOJ filings and public statements made clear that dismantling groups, not merely punishing individuals, was a core enforcement goal.

This approach was controversial, but it established a clear precedent: organized conduct would be treated as an aggravating factor, not a mitigating one.

II. Organized Disruption and the Current Enforcement Gap

Recent incidents involving coordinated interference with religious services exhibit characteristics DOJ has historically treated as legally significant:

• Continuity: Repeated actions across time rather than spontaneous protest

• Coordination: Defined roles such as entry teams, disruptors, lookouts, and media amplifiers

• Targeting: Selection of protected venues, including churches and congregants engaged in worship

• Intimidation: Conduct reasonably calculated to chill lawful religious exercise

Despite these features, enforcement responses have largely been confined to minor charges or individualized assessments that abstract actors from the organizations enabling their conduct.

The result is a structural inversion: organization now appears to diffuse liability rather than concentrate it.

III. Existing Authorities That Remain Underutilized

Federal law already provides multiple tools designed precisely for this category of conduct:

• 18 U.S.C. § 241 (Civil Rights Conspiracy): Criminalizes agreements to injure, threaten, or intimidate individuals in the free exercise of constitutional or federally protected rights, including religious worship.

• 18 U.S.C. § 247 (Obstruction of Religious Exercise): Targets intentional interference with religious services and institutions, whether or not physical violence occurs.

• 18 U.S.C. § 371 (General Conspiracy): Allows prosecutors to scale liability in proportion to coordination and planning.

• RICO (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968): Where continuity, leadership insulation, fundraising, and repeat operations can be shown, enterprise liability remains available.

These statutes were neither dormant nor controversial when applied aggressively in recent years. Their selective dormancy now reflects policy choice, not legal limitation.

IV. Consequences of Selective Restraint

Failure to apply these tools consistently produces three predictable outcomes:

1. Deterrence ErosionGroups learn that operating collectively reduces risk, incentivizing more sophisticated organization.

2. Legitimacy LossEnforcement begins to appear ideological rather than neutral, undermining public confidence in equal application of the law.

3. Escalatory BehaviorWhen early coordinated misconduct is tolerated, actors probe boundaries until more serious harm occurs.

History suggests that restraint applied selectively does not de-escalate conflict; it redistributes it.

V. Policy Implications

A neutral enforcement posture would not require harsher laws or broader discretion. It would require only that DOJ:

• Treat coordinated interference with protected activity as an organizational offense

• Apply conspiracy and enterprise theories where evidence supports them, irrespective of ideology

• Distinguish clearly between protected speech and coercive, coordinated conduct

• Reaffirm that organization aggravates liability rather than shielding it

This approach aligns with existing precedent and avoids the charge of novelty or overreach.

Conclusion

The Department of Justice has already demonstrated the scope of its authority. The current question is whether those authorities will be applied consistently—or selectively.

A system in which organized disruption of religious worship is met with restraint, while other forms of organized political misconduct are met with maximalist enforcement, is not practicing prudence. It is signaling preference.

Selective enforcement is not moderation. It is abdication.

Endnotes

1. 18 U.S.C. § 241.

2. 18 U.S.C. § 247.

3. 18 U.S.C. § 371.

4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act).

5. See DOJ charging memoranda and public statements, 2020–2024, emphasizing network disruption and conspiracy liability.