Sudan’s Genocide: Exposing the "Lack of "Justice System That Is the ICJ

WEIGHING OUT JUSTICE AT THE ICJ

I. The ICJ’s Rejection of Sudan’s Genocide Case: A Legal System Without Teeth

In January 2024, Sudan filed a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) accusing the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of aiding and abetting genocide by materially supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—a paramilitary group widely implicated in ethnic cleansing and atrocities across Sudan, particularly in Darfur and Khartoum. The evidence was substantial: reports of weapons being funneled through Libya and Chad, financial and logistical support from UAE-linked entities, and the RSF’s growing role in smuggling conflict gold to Dubai. Yet the ICJ dismissed the case outright.

The Court's rationale was simple: it lacked jurisdiction. Despite the gravity of Sudan's allegations, the ICJ found no binding legal pathway that compelled the UAE to submit to adjudication. Specifically, Sudan failed to demonstrate that both it and the UAE had consented to ICJ jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention’s Article IX, or via other mutually recognized instruments. In effect, the ICJ’s hands were tied—not by a lack of evidence or moral urgency, but by the formalistic architecture of its founding statutes.

This case revealed a brutal truth: the ICJ is not a court of justice in the common sense of the word. It is a tribunal of contractual dispute resolution—a forum that requires mutual consent, and often excludes the very people or nations most in need of legal recourse. While the ICJ eagerly accepts cases brought against Israel by third-party nations with no direct involvement—such as South Africa’s genocide case over Gaza—it is legally barred from hearing a case filed by a directly aggrieved party (Sudan) against a powerful, oil-rich Gulf state (UAE). This contradiction exposes the ICJ’s procedural rigidity and moral failure in addressing modern conflicts, especially those involving proxy warfare and asymmetric state actors.

II. The “Winning Approach”: Alternative Routes to Justice, Pressure, and Exposure

Recognizing the ICJ’s impotence, Sudan should have pursued a three-pronged alternative strategy, combining legal creativity, strategic diplomacy, and narrative warfare.

1. Legal Accountability via the ICC

Unlike the ICJ, the International Criminal Court (ICC) does not require mutual state consent to prosecute individuals. Given that Sudan has already been referred to the ICC in past resolutions, it could request that the Prosecutor open a supplementary investigation into foreign enablers of genocide—specifically, UAE-linked individuals and firms responsible for supplying arms to the RSF.

Example: The ICC’s investigation into Libyan arms trafficking networks revealed the potential for prosecuting aiding and abetting war crimes by foreign suppliers, even when those actors were not directly present in the combat zone.

Legal Win: Target the individuals and shell companies involved, rather than trying to indict the UAE as a whole—a more precise and jurisdictionally viable method.

2. Disruption of UAE Supply Chains to RSF

Sudan could have moved through regional and global diplomacy, using the African Union, Arab League, and sympathetic UN members to demand sanctions, embargoes, and commercial interdiction of UAE arms and financing routes.

Example: In Yemen, international monitoring groups helped expose UAE arms shipments to separatist militias, forcing DP World and other commercial partners to pause or reroute operations.

Strategic Win: Build a coalition to choke the RSF’s lifeline—not through moral appeals, but through naming, shaming, and embargoing UAE companies involved in conflict profiteering.

3. Global Recognition Through Political & Media Pressure

The United Nations General Assembly, UN Human Rights Council, and international watchdogs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch remain critical venues for exposing war crimes and compelling public accountability—even when legal institutions fail.

Example: The UN’s 2019 fact-finding mission on Myanmar’s military, which lacked formal enforcement power, nonetheless spurred global sanctions and reputational collapse for Burmese generals through sheer public exposure.

Narrative Win: Shift the battlefield to the court of public opinion—where evidence, survivor testimony, and media coverage can undermine UAE’s international image and partnerships.

III. UAE and Its Influence in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan: War as Strategy and Profit

The United Arab Emirates, often branded as a modernizing force in the Gulf, has in recent years embraced a model of postmodern imperialism—expanding its power not through direct annexation, but by backing paramilitary forces, securing trade corridors, and monetizing chaos.

Yemen: Naval Dominance Through Fragmentation

In Yemen, the UAE officially joined the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthi rebels. However, it quickly shifted to empowering the Southern Transitional Council (STC)—a separatist movement that it armed, trained, and enabled to take control of the port city of Aden and Socotra Island. The UAE built a quasi-military infrastructure in southern Yemen and used the conflict to install itself as a gatekeeper of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, through which 10% of global oil flows.

Motive: Strategic control of Red Sea trade routes, suppression of Muslim Brotherhood elements (e.g., Islah Party), and long-term maritime influence.

Libya: Proxies for Oil and Territory

In Libya, the UAE heavily backed General Khalifa Haftar—a strongman with secularist leanings and control over oil-rich eastern territories. The UAE provided drones, armored vehicles, and funding in direct defiance of the UN arms embargo. This enabled Haftar to nearly seize Tripoli, and although the campaign ultimately stalled, it earned the UAE a front-row seat in postwar Libyan oil negotiations and territorial demarcations.

Motive: Deny Turkey and Qatar influence in Libya, control or access to oil contracts, and project power across North Africa.

Sudan: Gold, Mercenaries, and Destabilization for Profit

The RSF, led by Mohamed "Hemedti" Dagalo, controls Sudan’s major gold mining regions, particularly in Darfur. This gold is smuggled into global markets—primarily through Dubai—where lax regulation allows conflict gold to be laundered into the legitimate economy. In return, the UAE has reportedly supplied the RSF with arms, transport, and political cover. RSF fighters have even served as UAE mercenaries in Yemen and Libya.

Motive: Access to illicit gold, deny democracy and rival factions a stable Sudanese state, and maintain a loyal paramilitary force on demand.

Conclusion: The Global Order’s Theater of Justice

The ICJ's refusal to hear Sudan’s case against the UAE is not a flaw—it is a feature of an international legal system designed to protect the powerful, not the victimized. When aggressors can hide behind jurisdictional technicalities and state consent doctrines, courts like the ICJ become obstacles, not avenues, for justice.

Sudan’s path to accountability lies not in the sterile halls of The Hague, but in a networked strategy of legal targeting, commercial pressure, and narrative warfare. And at the center of this story stands the UAE—a nation not of neutrality or peace, but of calculated empire-building through proxy war, gold smuggling, and militarized trade dominance.

The world may not yet call it imperialism. But Sudan surely knows what it looks like.