When the FAA Stopped Departures NationwideCivilian situation report | November 16, 2026

What happened Friday afternoon
At about 3:30 p.m. Eastern on Friday, November 13, the Federal Aviation Administration began experiencing technical problems on the network that carries communications and radar information for air traffic controllers. At a remote radio site in El Dorado, Arkansas, the FAA’s network contractor, L3Harris, had been doing routine work that included installing a new router. In its November 15 update, the FAA named that site and a radar site in Amarillo, Texas, as possible sources of a surge of connection attempts. Legacy equipment became unstable, and the disruption reached 17 of 22 en route control centers and several facilities that guide aircraft into and out of airports. [1]
The FAA stopped departures nationwide while controllers worked with aircraft already in the air. Some radio frequencies and radar feeds remained usable. Approximately 3,500 aircraft landed safely, and the FAA said critical lifesaving, law enforcement and military flights continued. L3Harris isolated both suspected sites, which stabilized the network. The FAA waited to confirm stability before departures resumed at 8:15 p.m. Eastern. The agency also disabled the same broadcasting function on roughly 60 similar routers as a precaution. [1]
Operators canceled approximately 12,462 flights that Friday, including 9,082 at major airlines. The FAA says the totals include cancellations for other reasons as well. Airlines continued restoring their schedules after departures resumed. The FAA and L3Harris were still investigating the root cause as of the agency’s November 15 update. The FAA said it had seen no indication of a cyberattack and would reevaluate when it schedules this kind of maintenance. [1]
What was already known
Finding | What the audits and agency reports show |
Three-quarters of systems were difficult to sustain or at risk of becoming so | The FAA’s 2023 assessment rated 51 of 138 systems unsustainable (37%) and 54 potentially unsustainable (39%). Of the 105 systems in those categories, 58 were critical to safe and efficient operations, split evenly between the two categories. The problems included shortages of spare parts, obsolete capabilities and inadequate funding to maintain or refresh equipment. [2, 3] |
Some systems had been in service for more than 60 years | Among the 105 systems, 73 had been deployed more than 20 years earlier, 40 more than 30 years earlier and six more than 60 years earlier. These age groups overlap. GAO identified 64 modernization investments covering 90 of the 105 systems. Some especially concerning systems were still a decade or more from modernization under the schedules GAO reviewed in 2024. GAO also flagged at-risk systems with no modernization plan, including three at least 30 years old. [2, 3] |
The telecom replacement went six years without approved targets | The FAA started its Enterprise Network Services replacement program in April 2018. By May 2024, it still lacked approved cost, schedule and performance targets. GAO’s recommendation to establish those targets promptly remains open on its public tracker. [2] |
Copper lines and floppy disks were still in use | By May 2026, FAA reported replacing 2,560 of 5,170 old copper connections with fiber. On November 5, it announced the first five installations of a new display system that replaces four 1980s-era systems used at more than 400 facilities. The old equipment included systems that used floppy disks for weather and other information. [4, 5] |
Staffing was thin at critical facilities | In 2023, the DOT inspector general found 20 of 26 critical facilities below the FAA’s 85% staffing threshold. New York approach control was at 54%, and Miami Tower was at 66%. Those figures describe conditions at the time of the audit. The FAA traced Friday’s disruption to the telecommunications network. [1, 6] |
Warnings and recommendations since 2012
Year and auditor | What was recommended | Where it stands |
2012 · Government Accountability Office (GAO) | Require a single schedule tying together all work on each major acquisition, independently check cost estimates and assess the risk of delays. 15 of 30acquisitions reviewed were delayed and 11had combined cost increases of $4.2 billion. | Closed after FAA changes. GAO verified changes to acquisition guidance and examples of its use. In 2026, GAO found the new overhaul lacked a single schedule for its first phase. [4, 7] |
2015 · DOT inspector general | After a fire disabled Chicago Center, redesign continuity plans, run more realistic drills and evaluate physically separating primary and backup communications equipment in future investments. | Closed after action, with some items taking years. The backup-separation recommendation closed in 2018 and the realistic-drills recommendation in 2024. The backup recommendation called for a feasibility and cost evaluation, so closing it established a narrower result than nationwide installation of separate backups. [8] |
2017 · DOT inspector general | Train controllers annually for communications or radar loss, verify each year that facilities can hand off control of airspace, and develop comparable plans and technical capabilities for oceanic airspace. | Training and validation closed years later. Training closed in 2020 and annual validation in 2024. The public audit record lists no closure date for the oceanic handoff recommendation. [9] |
2023 · GAO | Update the full lifecycle cost estimate for NextGen, measure performance against it and draw up a detailed plan for the program’s highest risks. | Both recommendations remain open. FAA supplied cost estimates through 2025. GAO was still awaiting longer-range estimates and an update on the risk plan in 2026. Two other recommendations, on investigating overruns and reporting revised targets, were implemented. [10] |
2024 · GAO | Tell Congress how the FAA is managing the risk of every system rated both critical and unsustainable. Promptly set approved cost, schedule and performance targets for modernization investments, including the telecom replacement. | Congressional reporting is partially addressed. The targets recommendation remains open. GAO closed the other five recommendations after changes to acquisition and oversight practices. [2] |
September 2026 · GAO | Produce a reliable estimate of what the new overhaul will cost over its life and a detailed schedule tying together the work in Phase 1. | Both remain open. GAO found 11,389 separate project schedules. Installations at the same sites were generally scheduled without coordinating them to minimize disruption to controllers. Congress appropriated $12.5 billion in 2025. Phase 1 targets December 2028. GAO reported no start or completion date for Phase 2. [4] |
Previous disruptions
In January 2023, a separate nationwide ground stop followed an outage in the system that distributes critical notices to pilots. The FAA said contractors unintentionally deleted files while working to synchronize the primary and backup databases. The agency announced that it had completed the first phase of the system’s cloud migration in 2026. In May 2025, a telecommunications outage interrupted radar displays and communications for Philadelphia-based controllers handling Newark airspace for approximately 90 seconds. [11–13]
What remains unresolved
Friday’s failure shows how a problem on a shared network can disrupt service far beyond the sites where it first appears. It came two months after GAO reported that the FAA was carrying out thousands of projects without an integrated schedule for coordinating installations. The investigation still has to establish how the surge started and why it spread across so many centers. The audit record already answers a separate question. Federal watchdogs have been asking the FAA to improve communications redundancy and coordinate major system changes for more than a decade. [1, 4, 7–9]
Sources
FAA, Nationwide Ground Stop Questions and Answers, November 15, 2026
GAO, FAA Actions Are Urgently Needed to Modernize Aging Systems, 2024
GAO, Congressional testimony on aging air traffic control systems, 2025
GAO, New Modernization Effort Needs to Improve Cost and Schedule Planning, September 2026
FAA, First deployments replacing floppy disk–based equipment, November 2026
DOT Office of Inspector General, Controller Staffing at Critical Facilities, 2023
GAO, Cost and Schedule Challenges in Air Traffic Control Modernization, 2012
DOT Office of Inspector General, Chicago Air Traffic Control Contingency Plans, 2015
DOT Office of Inspector General, FAA Response to Major System Disruptions, 2017
FAA, Completion of Phase One of the Pilot Alert System Overhaul, 2026
FAA, Aviation Incident Statements, including Newark, May 9, 2025




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