Pacific Strategic Intelligence WeeklyWeek Ending November 15, 2026

Executive Assessment
China’s latest military activity around Taiwan appears to be testing something more demanding than another short encirclement exercise. Taiwanese officials described the continuing deployments as “area denial” drills. Forces from the People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern, Northern and Southern Theater Commands operated around Taiwan and into the Western Pacific, while the Liaoning carrier group remained at sea for an extended period. Japanese monitoring also identified Chinese replenishment vessels moving through the Miyako corridor.
The operational question is sustainment. China is practicing how to keep several naval formations active beyond the first island chain, maintain them with large support ships and position forces between Taiwan and Guam. That pattern is consistent with an effort to delay or prevent American and allied forces from reaching Taiwan during a contingency. It is better understood as a rehearsal for extended isolation than as proof of an imminent invasion.
The political method is equally important. Beijing did not give the activity a dramatic exercise name or accompany it with the usual public warnings. Chinese messaging instead portrayed the deployments as routine. Normalization can be strategically useful: if unusually large operations become accepted as ordinary, China can shorten warning time, weaken international reaction and gradually establish a new expectation of permanent military presence east of Taiwan.
The allied response also became more concrete. Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States announced that they will establish a Combined Coordination Center in the Philippines. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said a coordination mechanism is already operating, with domain awareness, information sharing and interoperability among its principal purposes. Australia and the Philippines also signed a defense-cooperation arrangement intended to reduce administrative obstacles and expand cooperation in maritime awareness, exercises, equipment, disaster response and infrastructure.
These initiatives begin to answer the problem China is presenting. A sustained isolation campaign cannot be countered by occasional exercises alone. It requires a persistent common operating picture, standing command relationships, dispersed fuel and ammunition, accessible ports and airfields, repair capacity, secure communications and rehearsed political authorities.
PACIFICA assesses the week as one of competing operational systems. China is testing whether it can sustain pressure beyond the first island chain. The regional coalition is testing whether four national forces can coordinate quickly enough to prevent that pressure from becoming control.
Strategic Indicators Dashboard
Arrows show the direction of change during this reporting week, not a value judgment. ► indicates no verified weekly change.
Indicator | Assessment at cutoff | Trend |
Regional military stability | Stable, but prolonged Chinese operations reduce warning time and increase the burden on regional forces | ▼ |
Chinese operations around Taiwan | Large formations from three theater commands continued an unannounced area-denial exercise | ▲ |
Taiwan eastern-approach security | Chinese forces operated between Taiwan and Guam while the Liaoning group remained deployed | ▼ |
PLA blue-water sustainment | Replenishment ships and extended deployments indicate growing endurance beyond the first island chain | ▲ |
Chinese military normalization | Beijing is presenting unusually large deployments as routine sovereign activity | ▲ |
Four-country defense coordination | Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States announced a Combined Coordination Center | ▲ |
Philippines–Australia defense integration | A new arrangement reduces administrative friction and expands maritime and infrastructure cooperation | ▲ |
Philippine maritime awareness | Additional Australian monitoring, drone, equipment and training support was announced | ▲ |
Japan southwestern-island security | Chinese naval transits continue to make the Miyako corridor central to regional monitoring | ▼ |
Taiwan commercial resilience | Blockade planning is receiving more attention, but energy, shipping and data vulnerabilities remain | ► |
Korean Peninsula stability | The previous week’s mixed missile activity remains unresolved; no larger new launch was verified | ► |
American Samoa seabed leasing | Auction is scheduled for November 19; qualified bidders have not been publicly identified | ▲ |
CNMI seabed leasing | The proposed December 16 sale lacks a published final notice at cutoff | ▼ |
Commercial infrastructure opportunity | Strong in maritime awareness, secure communications, logistics, repair and distributed infrastructure | ▲ |
I. Regional Overview
The strategic contest around Taiwan is shifting from the question of whether China can surround the island temporarily to whether it can sustain a wider exclusion system.
A blockade would focus on stopping or inspecting commercial traffic. An isolation campaign would be broader. It would attempt to keep American, Japanese, Australian and Philippine forces far enough away that Taiwan could be pressured without effective outside relief. Such a campaign would require operations east of Taiwan, across the Bashi Channel, near Japan’s southwestern islands and along the approaches from Guam.
The recent Chinese formations match that geography. More than 100 naval and coast-guard ships reportedly operated across an arc extending from the South China Sea into the Philippine Sea and toward Guam. The precise tactical relationships among every vessel are not publicly known, but the deployment demonstrated an ability to assemble forces from several theater commands and keep major elements at sea for weeks.
The regional response is also moving beyond bilateral agreements. The new Combined Coordination Center is potentially the most important institutional development of the week because it can connect national sensors, plans and forces before a crisis. Its value, however, will depend on authorities and infrastructure rather than the center’s name.
PACIFICA therefore applies the same buildability test to both sides:
Can China replenish and protect several task groups beyond the first island chain?
Can the four-country coalition detect, classify and share Chinese movements continuously?
Can political leaders authorize coordinated action before isolation becomes a fait accompli?
Can dispersed allied forces be fueled, repaired and protected under missile and cyber pressure?
Can Taiwan preserve commercial traffic, energy supply and communications long enough for assistance to matter?
II. Featured Assessment
China Practices Extended Isolation Rather Than a Short Blockade
Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington Koo described China’s continuing deployments as “area denial drills” intended to prevent the United States and other partners from intervening in a Taiwan contingency. Reuters reported that ships from China’s Eastern, Northern and Southern Theater Commands were involved, with formations operating around Taiwan and into the Western Pacific. Reuters
The Institute for the Study of War assessed that China was likely conducting a major unannounced exercise simulating extended isolation. It noted that large naval formations remained east of Taiwan even after the total vessel count declined and that the Liaoning group had been deployed for approximately a month. Institute for the Study of War
The exercise had four notable characteristics.
1. Multi-theater participation
The involvement of forces from three theater commands suggests a test of command relationships across organizations that do not routinely conduct one integrated operation. China’s Eastern Theater Command would be central to a Taiwan contingency, but Northern and Southern Theater forces could provide additional surface combatants, escorts, air defense and logistics.
The critical evidence still needed is whether the formations shared a single operational command structure or merely operated in parallel. Integration is much harder than concentration.
2. Operations beyond the first island chain
Forces positioned east of Taiwan and toward Guam can threaten the routes along which allied aircraft, ships and supplies would approach. This geography also places pressure on the Philippine Sea rather than only the Taiwan Strait.
The objective may be to create enough risk that allied forces must fight for access before they can help Taiwan. That would make the conflict’s first operational problem one of theater entry, not direct defense of Taiwan’s coastline.
3. Replenishment and endurance
Japan’s Joint Staff reported Chinese destroyers and replenishment vessels moving through the waters between Okinawa and Miyako. The movements do not prove that every ship was supporting one exercise, but they demonstrate the logistics pattern required for sustained operations east of Taiwan. Japan Joint Staff activity releases
Carriers and surface groups consume fuel, aviation stores, food, spare parts and munitions. The longer China remains deployed, the more revealing the exercise becomes about replenishment frequency, escort requirements, maintenance and crew endurance.
4. Deliberate normalization
Unlike previous named exercises, this activity was largely presented as routine. Chinese state media argued that military and coast-guard operations around Taiwan are regular sovereign activity.
This messaging reduces the distinction between crisis and peacetime. If large deployments become common, Taiwan and its partners must decide whether to maintain expensive elevated readiness continuously or accept the possibility that an exercise can transition into coercion with little warning.
PLA isolation-campaign buildability test
Requirement | Evidence this week | Proof still needed |
Multi-theater command | Forces from three theater commands operated in the wider area | Evidence of unified command, shared targeting and coordinated tasking |
Persistent surface presence | Large formations remained east of Taiwan for weeks | Sustainable rotation without unacceptable readiness losses elsewhere |
Carrier endurance | Liaoning group maintained an extended deployment | Sortie generation, maintenance reliability and magazine depth |
Replenishment | Large support ships transited key Japanese passages | Protected logistics cycles under allied submarine and air threat |
Area denial | Forces operated between Taiwan and Guam | Integrated submarines, aircraft, missiles, sensors and surface units |
Isolation of Taiwan | Encirclement and eastern operations were visible | Capacity to control commercial and military access simultaneously |
Legal and information framing | Beijing characterized the activity as routine | Regional commercial compliance with Chinese warnings or instructions |
Escalation control | Exercise remained below open conflict | Ability to avoid unintended clashes during persistent close operations |
China demonstrated scale and duration. It did not yet publicly demonstrate that its surface formations could survive a determined allied campaign or maintain an airtight isolation perimeter. The exercise should therefore be treated as a serious capability test, not as proof of completed control.
III. The Combined Coordination Center
The “Squad” Begins Building a Standing Operating Mechanism
Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the United States announced plans to establish a Combined Coordination Center in the Philippines. Their November 10 joint statement also called for synchronized defense investment, expanded exercises and stronger policy consultation. Japan Ministry of Defense
Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said a coordination mechanism was already operating and identified domain awareness, information sharing and interoperability as principal functions. He also indicated that exercise coordination had moved from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Education and Training Command to Strategic Command.
That administrative change matters. It suggests that cooperation is being treated less as a training event and more as an operational responsibility.
The center could provide five functions:
a shared maritime and air operating picture;
coordination of exercises and peacetime patrols;
development of common contingency plans;
prioritization of infrastructure and equipment investment; and
a crisis mechanism for assigning national contributions without creating a formal alliance command.
It should not be assumed that the center will possess NATO-style authority. Each government will retain national command and politically sensitive information may remain compartmented. The center’s effectiveness will therefore depend on pre-agreed procedures that allow useful coordination without waiting for complete political or technical integration.
Combined Coordination Center buildability test
Requirement | Present position | Proof still needed |
Political authority | Four defense ministers endorsed the center | Agreed mandate for peacetime, gray-zone and conflict conditions |
Physical organization | A Philippine-based mechanism is reportedly operating | Confirmed staffing, location, secure facilities and continuity plan |
Common operating picture | Domain awareness is a stated mission | Continuous sensor feeds, common standards and releasability rules |
Communications | Four countries possess advanced national systems | Protected cross-domain networks resilient to cyber and jamming |
Planning | Joint exercises and concepts are expanding | Approved contingency plans and decision timelines |
Logistics | ACSA, EDCA and other bilateral arrangements provide partial authorities | Integrated fuel, ammunition, repair, medical and transport planning |
Infrastructure | Partners agreed to synchronize investments | Funded projects tied to operational requirements and survivability |
Command relationships | National commands remain sovereign | Clear lead, liaison and conflict-resolution procedures |
The center’s strongest near-term value may be outside open war. It can coordinate surveillance of research ships, coast-guard activity, militia vessels and undersea-cable threats while building habits that would be needed during a larger crisis.
IV. Philippines and Australia
A Bilateral Agreement Adds Practical Capacity to the Four-Country Framework
The Philippines and Australia signed a defense-cooperation arrangement on November 15 intended to simplify implementation of their existing visiting-forces framework and reduce administrative delays. Officials identified maritime awareness, information sharing, exercises, equipment procurement, disaster response and defense infrastructure as areas of cooperation. Australia also announced further support for maritime monitoring, including drones, equipment and training. Reuters
The agreement is strategically useful because coalitions often fail through administrative friction rather than lack of political intent. Customs approvals, entry permissions, contracting rules, communications releases and liability arrangements can delay forces even when governments agree on the mission.
Australia can contribute:
maritime patrol and surveillance experience;
training and exercise depth;
deployable headquarters personnel;
infrastructure finance and engineering;
drones and sensor integration;
logistics across the southern approaches; and
shipbuilding and repair capacity if its industrial base is preserved.
The Philippines contributes geography. Northern Luzon and the Batanes Islands overlook the Bashi Channel; western bases face the South China Sea; southern access supports routes toward Indonesia and Australia. The value of that geography depends on whether facilities can function under pressure.
Philippine distributed-infrastructure screen
Requirement | Strategic purpose | Principal constraint |
Airfields | Surveillance, dispersal and rapid reinforcement | Runway repair, fuel, shelters and air defense |
Ports | Patrol, replenishment and repair | Depth, cranes, spares, security and maintenance capacity |
Sensors | Monitor Bashi Channel and South China Sea approaches | Persistent coverage and secure fusion |
Drones | Extend surveillance without exhausting manned fleets | Payloads, electronic resilience and lifecycle support |
Communications | Connect Philippine and partner forces | Cybersecurity, bandwidth and common standards |
Stockpiles | Sustain forces before reinforcement arrives | Protection, dispersal and political approval |
Disaster response | Provides frequent peacetime use and public legitimacy | Avoiding diversion of war-resilience investments into symbolic projects |
The new arrangement is promising because it addresses process and equipment together. Its next test is whether announced support becomes delivered systems, trained personnel and funded facilities.
V. Taiwan’s Commercial and Industrial Resilience
Isolation Planning Moves from Military Theory to Business Risk
Reuters reported that companies in Australia are already offering training to help businesses assess continuity during a Taiwan blockade or regional conflict. TSMC’s overseas fabrication investments also reduce some concentration risk, although leading-edge production and much of the supplier ecosystem remain centered in Taiwan.
Commercial resilience must be evaluated across several connected systems:
imported LNG, oil and coal;
port availability and vessel access;
electricity and water for semiconductor production;
undersea cables and satellite backup;
aviation links for personnel and high-value cargo;
marine insurance and war-risk pricing; and
inventory of specialized chemicals, gases and replacement equipment.
The strategic danger is not only physical interdiction. Chinese coast-guard warnings, selective inspections, cyberattacks, customs declarations and insurance repricing could cause private carriers to reduce service before a formal blockade is declared.
Taiwan isolation-resilience test
System | Present strength | Proof still needed |
Energy supply | Diverse suppliers and prospective Alaska LNG option | Storage and deliverability during prolonged disruption |
Ports | High-capacity commercial terminals | Redundancy, repair and operation under missile or cyber pressure |
Semiconductors | World-leading production and strong demand | Power, water, personnel and outbound logistics continuity |
Cables | Dense international connectivity | Rapid repair, route diversity and protected repair ships |
Maritime awareness | Growing Coast Guard, military and unmanned collection | Trusted common picture east of Taiwan and through Bashi Channel |
Shipping | Deep integration with global carriers | Carrier willingness and sovereign insurance support during coercion |
Finance | Advanced financial system | Settlement and trade finance during sanctions or communications disruption |
Taiwan’s deterrent value is often described through semiconductors. That value persists only if partners believe the island’s economic system can remain functional long enough to justify and support intervention.
VI. Pacific Islands and Energy Competition
Beijing Moves to Occupy the Commercial Space Left by Taiwan in Papua New Guinea
Following Taiwan’s closure of its representative office and termination of new spot LNG purchases from Papua New Guinea, Chinese officials indicated that Beijing was willing to increase LNG imports from the country. The sequence illustrates how diplomatic and commercial competition can reinforce one another.
China’s expression of interest is not yet equivalent to a binding purchase agreement. The commercial effect will depend on volumes, pricing, contract length, shipping arrangements and whether Chinese demand replaces only lost spot cargoes or becomes connected to the proposed Papua LNG expansion.
For Papua New Guinea, additional Chinese demand could protect export revenue. It could also increase dependence on a buyer that is simultaneously expanding political influence. Australia, Japan, the United States and Taiwan should therefore distinguish between objecting to China’s role and offering commercially credible alternatives.
PNG gas alignment screen
Question | Current position | Evidence to watch |
Has China replaced lost Taiwan demand? | Political willingness has been signaled | Binding contracts, volumes and first cargoes |
Does the offer affect Papua LNG? | Timing overlaps the project’s financing phase | Named offtake, equity or lending participation |
Does Taiwan retain long-term purchases? | Official action focused on new spot contracts | Cargo records and contract statements |
Can PNG diversify buyers? | Asian LNG demand remains broad | Japanese, Korean, Australian and other commitments |
Does commercial dependence change policy? | China gained diplomatic space | Subsequent positions on Taiwan, security and infrastructure |
VII. Pacific Seabed Minerals
American Samoa Reaches Auction Week
The Marine Minerals Administration is scheduled to hold Lease Sale PACM-1 on November 19 at 9:00 a.m. Pacific Time. Two areas totaling approximately 31.5 million acres will be offered through an ascending oral auction. Each area carries a $3 million minimum bid. Only qualified bidders may participate. Marine Minerals Administration American Samoa process portal
The financial-form deadline, deposit deadline and qualified-bidder seminar have passed. Yet the identity and number of qualified bidders were not publicly established at the reporting cutoff. That makes bidder disclosure the principal watch item of the coming week.
A provisional winner would receive an opportunity to conduct surveys and characterization. It would not receive authorization to begin commercial mining. Any later delineation, testing or mining plan would require separate approval and environmental review.
Auction-week due diligence
Question | Why it matters |
How many bidders qualified? | Reveals whether the auction is competitive or effectively bilateral |
Who ultimately controls each bidder? | Identifies strategic and financial dependencies |
What capital is committed? | Deep-sea characterization may consume funds for years before revenue |
What collection technology exists? | A concept or prototype is not an operating mining system |
Which vessels and ports are planned? | Logistics may become the binding constraint |
Where will material be processed? | Extraction without allied refining preserves Chinese dependence |
What benefits reach American Samoa? | Local legitimacy depends on jobs, training, infrastructure and enforceability |
How will litigation be handled? | Legal uncertainty can delay activity after a nominal auction victory |
The CNMI process has become more doubtful on timing. The proposed auction date is December 16, but federal rules require publication of a Final Leasing Notice at least 30 days before the sale. No final notice was identified by PACIFICA at the November 15 cutoff. Unless publication is imminent or the schedule changes, the proposed date may no longer be achievable under the stated process.
VIII. Japan and the Wider Industrial Network
GCAP Connects Pacific Airpower to European Industrial Capacity
The defense ministers of Japan, the United Kingdom and Italy met virtually on November 11 to discuss the Global Combat Air Programme, their joint next-generation fighter project. Japan described GCAP as a long-term bridge between Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic technology and industry. Japan Ministry of Defense
GCAP is not a response to this week’s Chinese exercise, but the exercise clarifies its strategic relevance. Sustained area denial places a premium on long-range sensing, networked weapons, electronic warfare, survivability and the ability to operate from dispersed bases.
The program’s buildability will depend on workshare, export rules, software authority, supply-chain security, production scale and delivery schedule. A next-generation aircraft arriving too late or in insufficient numbers will not solve near-term capacity gaps.
IX. Opportunities and Constraints
Opportunity | Present stage | Next proof point / principal constraint |
Four-country coordination center | Political agreement announced; mechanism reportedly operating | Mandate, staffing, secure networks and contingency authority |
Philippine maritime awareness | Australian drones, equipment and training announced | Delivered systems, persistent coverage and integration |
Distributed Philippine infrastructure | Partners agreed to synchronize investment | Funded ports, airfields, fuel, repair and protection |
Taiwan eastern-approach surveillance | Operational demand demonstrated by Chinese deployments | Continuous multinational picture between Taiwan and Guam |
Allied logistics | ACSA, EDCA and bilateral mechanisms are expanding | Stockpiles, replenishment, repair and crisis access |
Commercial continuity planning | Businesses are beginning blockade exercises | Insurer, carrier, energy and semiconductor participation |
PNG LNG diversification | China has signaled interest after Taiwan’s withdrawal | Binding offtake and balanced buyer portfolio |
American Samoa seabed minerals | Auction scheduled for November 19 | Qualified bidders, auction result, litigation and local benefit |
CNMI seabed minerals | Proposed sale remains on the calendar | Final notice, qualified bidders and revised timing if required |
GCAP industrial cooperation | Trilateral political commitment remains strong | Workshare, export rules, cost control and delivery |
Sector Outlook
Sector | Outlook | Principal driver |
Maritime surveillance and data fusion | Very Strong | Sustained Chinese operations across several commands and operating areas |
Secure communications | Very Strong | Combined Coordination Center and multinational domain awareness |
Unmanned air and maritime systems | Very Strong | Philippine monitoring and Taiwan eastern-approach requirements |
Port engineering and repair | Strong | Distributed logistics and prolonged naval operations |
Fuel storage and resilient power | Strong | Island-chain sustainment and Taiwan commercial continuity |
Cybersecurity and electronic resilience | Very Strong | Shared networks operating under jamming and intrusion risk |
Military logistics software | Strong | Four-country coordination and dispersed stockpiles |
Critical-mineral exploration | Strong | American Samoa auction and CNMI process |
Mineral processing and refining | Very Strong | Strategic requirement for non-Chinese supply chains |
LNG contracting and infrastructure | Strong | Taiwan diversification and PNG buyer competition |
Political-risk and marine insurance | Growing | Isolation scenarios and gray-zone interference |
Project finance | Selective | Large capital needs, long schedules and legal uncertainty |
X. Key Risks
Exercise normalization reduces warning time
If major Chinese deployments become routine, Taiwan and its partners may struggle to distinguish coercive preparation from training until forces are already positioned.
Coordination without authority
The Combined Coordination Center could become a useful information hub but remain unable to direct action during a fast-moving crisis. Political authorities must be established before they are needed.
Logistics remain the weak link
Allied forces may possess capable ships and aircraft but lack protected fuel, ammunition, repair and communications at the required locations.
Infrastructure becomes targetable before it becomes resilient
Highly visible investment in a few Philippine bases could create vulnerable concentrations unless capacity is dispersed and hardened.
Commercial retreat precedes military isolation
Insurers, carriers and suppliers may reduce exposure in response to ambiguous Chinese enforcement activity, producing part of a blockade’s effect without open hostilities.
Pacific energy competition creates new dependencies
PNG may replace Taiwanese demand with Chinese purchases but exchange one commercial relationship for a more politically concentrated one.
Auction enthusiasm is mistaken for mining capacity
American Samoa bid prices will show interest, not technical or commercial viability. Processing, vessels, finance and consent remain unresolved.
XI. Developments to Watch
Chinese force dispersal — Determine which formations return to port and which remain east of Taiwan after the apparent exercise.
PLA replenishment cycles — Track support ships, port calls, resupply frequency and escorts through Japanese passages.
Carrier aviation tempo — Watch Liaoning sortie rates, maintenance pauses and aircraft losses or failures.
Combined Coordination Center — Identify location, staffing, command relationships and secure communications architecture.
Philippines–Australia implementation — Follow drone procurement, maritime-monitoring equipment, exercises and infrastructure funding.
Philippine Strategic Command — Assess whether it gains real authority for multinational operational planning.
Taiwan business continuity — Watch energy inventories, carrier policies, insurance pricing and semiconductor contingency planning.
China–PNG LNG agreements — Distinguish political expressions of interest from binding commercial commitments.
American Samoa auction — Identify every qualified bidder and provisional winner on November 19.
American Samoa bid quality — Examine ownership, finance, technology, processing and local-benefit commitments.
American Samoa litigation — Monitor any emergency filing or court order affecting the auction or lease issuance.
CNMI Final Leasing Notice — Determine whether the proposed December 16 auction is delayed or formally revised.
Korean missile production — Watch whether recent tests transition into visible deployment or export indicators.
GCAP milestones — Follow industrial workshare, export governance and development schedule.
Commercial reaction to Chinese normalization — Monitor route changes, warnings, inspections and marine-risk assessments east of Taiwan.
Final Assessment
China’s recent activity should not be described simply as another Taiwan drill. Its significance lies in duration, geography and logistics.
Beijing appears to be testing whether forces from several theater commands can maintain a large presence east of Taiwan, operate between the island and Guam, and sustain themselves through the passages around Japan. The absence of a dramatic announcement is part of the strategy. China benefits if a force posture capable of isolation is gradually treated as routine.
The four-country Combined Coordination Center is a proportionate response because the problem is not only a shortage of weapons. It is a shortage of integrated time. Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, Australia and the United States must identify what China is doing, share that judgment and coordinate national actions before a distributed deployment becomes an exclusion zone.
The center will matter only if it connects to physical capacity. Information requires sensors and secure networks. Plans require political authority. Aircraft require fuel and protected runways. Ships require ports, repair and magazines. Taiwan requires energy, cables and commercial carriers that continue operating under pressure.
This is the week’s central PACIFICA judgment: China is rehearsing endurance, while the regional coalition is beginning to institutionalize coordination. The strategic balance will turn on which system becomes operational first.
Principal Sources
Reuters — China’s area-denial drills send a message beyond Taiwan
Institute for the Study of War — China–Taiwan Update, November 13, 2026
Japan Ministry of Defense — Australia–Japan–Philippines–United States joint statement
Reuters — Philippines and Australia sign defense arrangement
Marine Minerals Administration — American Samoa Final Leasing Notice
Japan Ministry of Defense — Japan–United Kingdom–Italy GCAP meeting




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