U.S. Troops Killed in Syria: What Happened—and What Must Be Learned

Sgt. William Nathaniel Howard, Sgt. Edgar Brian Torres-Tovar, U.S. Army National Guard (Iowa)

PART I — NEWS REPORT (FACTUAL SUMMARY)

Who

• Sgt. William Nathaniel Howard, U.S. Army National Guard (Iowa)

• Sgt. Edgar Brian Torres-Tovar, U.S. Army National Guard (Iowa)

• Ayad Mansoor Sakat, U.S. civilian interpreter (Michigan)

All three were supporting U.S. counter-ISIS operations under U.S. Central Command.

What

A U.S. and partner-force patrol operating near Palmyra, central Syria, came under small-arms attack, resulting in three U.S. fatalities and additional wounded personnel. The attacker was reportedly neutralized at the scene, and Syrian authorities later announced arrests connected to the incident.

When

• December 13, 2025 — Attack occurred

• December 17–18, 2025 — Remains returned to the United States in a dignified transfer ceremony

Where

• Central Syria, near Palmyra, an area characterized by:

  • Open desert

  • Ruins and broken urban terrain

  • Known ISIS cell activity despite the group’s territorial defeat

Why

According to U.S. officials, the patrol was part of an ongoing counter-ISIS mission intended to suppress remaining ISIS cells, disrupt leadership, and support partner forces.

ISIS later issued public messaging portraying the attack as a successful strike against U.S. and allied forces.

How

• The patrol was conducting movement outside a fixed base

• Contact occurred via small-arms fire, consistent with ISIS cell-based ambush tactics

• The attack took place in terrain favoring concealment and rapid disengagement

PART II — AFTER-ACTION ANALYSIS (NON-CLASSIFIED, DOCTRINAL)

This section addresses force structure, posture, and lessons learned, not individual fault.

1. Force Package Assessment

Key Issue

The operation appears to have been conducted with a very light troop package for the threat environment.

Even in a low-signature mission, doctrine and experience suggest that movement in insurgent terrain requires at least two fire teams to retain tactical flexibility.

Doctrinal Minimum for Independent Movement

A survivable light force typically includes:

• Two fire teams (≈8 personnel)

• Patrol leader

• Medic

• Comms / ISR enabler

• Interpreter

• Vehicle or air support on call

Total: ~10–12 U.S. personnel minimum

This is not a “heavy” posture — it is the minimum force mass needed to maneuver under contact.

Why Two Fire Teams Matter

Two fire teams allow:

• Immediate suppression

• Bounding movement

• Flank security

• Casualty treatment under cover

• Controlled break-contact or maneuver

With fewer personnel:

• Suppression and treatment compete for manpower

• Casualties occur faster

• Initiative shifts to the attacker

2. Terrain-Driven Risk

The Palmyra area presents:

• Long sight lines for enemy observation

• Limited natural cover

• Ruins and wadis ideal for ambush

• Predictable movement routes

This terrain punishes small numbers, even against lightly armed adversaries.

3. Rules of Engagement (ROE) Considerations

While specific ROE remain classified, persistent challenges in Syria-type operations include:

• Positive identification thresholds that delay engagement

• Emphasis on de-escalation in areas with civilian or partner presence

• Constraints on preemptive fires or movement control

These factors can unintentionally favor an enemy that:

• Chooses the time and place of contact

• Is unconcerned with escalation or attribution

4. Air and CASEVAC Support (Critical Enablers)

A properly resourced light operation would normally include:

• Dedicated ISR coverage (UAS or manned)

• On-call close air support

• Planned CASEVAC routes and timelines

While some support may have existed, the incident underscores the need for:

• Faster response windows

• Redundancy

• Clear authority for rapid escalation under contact

5. What Likely Went Wrong (Systemic, Not Personal)

Based on available information:

• Threat environment underestimated

• Force mass insufficient for terrain

• Reliance on minimal footprint over survivability

• Strategic desire for low visibility transferred risk downward

This is a structural policy issue, not a reflection of soldier competence.

6. What the Military Should Learn

A. Match Force to Reality, Not Narrative

If ISIS remains operational:

• Force packages must reflect active insurgency, not post-conflict assumptions

B. Two Fire Teams Should Be the Floor

Anything less during movement should require:

• Explicit risk acceptance

• Higher-level approval

• Compensating ISR and air cover

C. Investigate Fully and Transparently

The event should be reviewed via:

• AR 15-6 investigation

• Clear examination of:

  • Mission planning

  • Force composition

  • Intelligence assumptions

  • ROE constraints

  • Support availability

D. Public Accountability

Without revealing tactics or sources, the Department of Defense should:

• Explain why the force package was deemed sufficient

• Clarify how risk is assessed in Syria

• Communicate what changes will be made

7. Why Transparency Matters

American troops are operating in Syria:

• Without a formal declaration of war

• With limited public debate

• In an environment still capable of lethal contact

Transparency is not political — it is owed to the families, the force, and the public.

CONCLUSION

The deaths of Sgt. Howard, Sgt. Torres-Tovar, and Ayad Mansoor Sakat were not the result of inexperience or negligence at the tactical level. They reflect the dangers of operating with minimal force mass in a live insurgent environmentunder a strategy designed to remain politically invisible.

If the United States chooses to keep forces in Syria, it must:

• Resource missions honestly

• Match doctrine to terrain

• Accept visibility in exchange for survivability

Anything less risks repeating this tragedy.