HOW THE AIR FORCE ONE DEBACLE SHINES THE SPOTLIGHT ON THE FAILURES OF MILITARY PROCUREMENT

"President Trump defended accepting a $400 million aircraft from Qatar to temporarily replace Air Force One, arguing that the aircraft is more “impressive” than the current presidential plane. 

“The plane that you are on right now is almost 40 years old,” Trump told Fox News host Sean Hannity, in an interview Monday as the president traveled to Saudi Arabia aboard Air Force One. 

“And when you land and you see Saudi Arabia and you see [the United Arab Emirates] and you can see Qatar and you see all these – and they have these brand new Boeing 747s, mostly, and you see ours next to it –  this is like a totally different plane,” the president continued. 

“It’s much smaller. It’s much less impressive, as impressive as it is,” Trump said of Air Force One, a modified Boeing 747-200B aircraft that was introduced into service in 1990. “And you know, we’re the United States of America – I believe that we should have the most impressive plane.” Victor Nava, NY Post, 5/13/25

Amazingly, the democratic wing of the United States elected government finds lights to complain about with this. The spotlight is on Trump as paid man of the Arabs, Trump as Emir, etc. not too much on Trump saving the US gov't $400 million dollars or more importantly, how long has there been a need for a new Air Force One and why can't the United States have one built?

Let's take the time machine back to the Presidency of Barack H. Obama?!

🕰️ Timeline: Selection of the Boeing 747-8 for Air Force One

• 2009: The U.S. Air Force initiated the search for a new presidential aircraft to replace the aging VC-25A fleet. A Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued, outlining requirements such as a four-engine, wide-body aircraft capable of meeting the unique demands of presidential transport. Wikipedia+2Air Force+2NPR+2

• January 28, 2015: After evaluating available options, the Air Force officially announced the selection of the Boeing 747-8 platform to serve as the next Air Force One. This decision was based on the aircraft's ability to meet the necessary capabilities for the presidential support mission and its status as the only U.S.-manufactured aircraft fitting the criteria. (Ed. Note. we are talking about the same airframe Boeing 747 being replaced with a new version, no real re-design or new design being fabricated)

• January 2015: The U.S. Air Force announced the selection of the Boeing 747-8 platform to replace the existing VC-25A aircraft. Wikipedia

• August 2017: To reduce costs, the Air Force procured two undelivered 747-8 aircraft initially built for the now-defunct Russian airline Transaero. Wikipedia+1aeroplanewallpaper.blogspot.com+1

• February 2018: A fixed-price contract valued at $3.9 billion was finalized with Boeing for the development and modification of the two VC-25B aircraft. The War Zone+7Wikipedia+7Breaking Defense+7

• March 2020: Modification work commenced at Boeing's San Antonio facility, including structural changes and the installation of specialized systems. The Business Journals+2Wikipedia+2San Antonio Express-News+2

• July 2022: Due to various delays, including supplier issues and the COVID-19 pandemic, the delivery schedule was revised. The first aircraft is now expected between September 2027 and February 2028, with the second following thereafter. Breaking Defense

• May 2025: Reports indicate that the program may experience further delays, potentially pushing the initial operational capability to 2029.

So basically, if one were to take into consideration the amount of years spent developing reports on basically the same airplane that is replacing the old airplane, you can see the amount of years it takes the US Air Force/Department of Defense to generate a commission to purchase of produce an aircraft and have it go into operation.

20 YEARS!!!!???? ROUGHLY $1.9 BILLION A PIECE FOR 2??!?!?

So let's dive into the murky waters of the swamp that is the Procurement process for the Department of Defense.

Title: The Procurement Trap: How the U.S. Department of Defense Risks Losing Tomorrow's Wars Today

Executive Summary: The United States Department of Defense (DoD) continues to rely on archaic, bureaucratic procurement processes that are incompatible with the speed and adaptability demanded by modern warfare. High-profile projects like the Air Force One replacement (VC-25B), the F-35 Lightning II, and delayed rotorcraft systems such as the CH-53K exemplify a trend that, if uncorrected, could render the United States militarily obsolete in a future conflict. Adversarial nations are embracing low-cost, scalable, rapidly evolving technologies such as AI-enhanced drones, fire-and-forget loitering munitions, and swarm robotics. Without urgent reform, the U.S. risks being trapped in a web of outdated systems and inflexible doctrine.

I. Introduction: The Crisis in Military Adaptability

In an era where the tempo of technological innovation is measured in months rather than decades, the U.S. Department of Defense continues to plan, build, and deploy systems using Cold War-era timelines. The result is a military that remains capable on paper but potentially brittle on the battlefield. Bureaucratic delays, inflated costs, and inflexible doctrines hamper the nation’s ability to respond dynamically to emerging threats.

II. Case Study: The Air Force One Replacement (VC-25B)

• Origin of Program: Initiated in 2009 to replace aging VC-25A jets (modified 747-200Bs).

• Platform Chosen: Boeing 747-8 Intercontinental, selected in 2015.

• Contract Signed: 2018, at $3.9 billion.

• Current Status: Delivery delayed to 2027–2029 due to modification issues, supplier failures, and cost escalations.

• Strategic Implication: A decade-long procurement cycle for two aircraft demonstrates the system's inability to rapidly field even symbolic or niche assets.

III. Other Procurement Failures and Delays

• F-35 Lightning II

  • Projected cost: $200B ➔ Actual: $406B+

  • Operational capability delayed by years.

  • Early software and parts obsolescence before full fleet deployment.

• CH-53K King Stallion

  • Originally set for combat readiness by 2019.

  • Beset by vibration and drivetrain issues; delayed well beyond target dates.

• General Dynamics Ajax (UK, as a parallel)

  • A cautionary tale in NATO procurement: design flaws rendered armored units non-deployable for years.

IV. Emerging Threats: Asymmetry and Speed

• Ukraine's Drone Doctrine: Rapidly produced, crowd-funded, FPV drones have reshaped artillery targeting and ISR operations.

• Iran's Shahed-136 Drones: Fire-and-forget loitering munitions used en masse, effective against both static and mobile targets.

• China's AI Battlefield Integration: Emphasis on intelligentized warfare, battlefield autonomy, and cognitive EW (electronic warfare) bypasses conventional U.S. control loops.

V. Strategic Consequences of Inflexibility

If the U.S. military remains structured around long-cycle, capital-intensive procurement:

• We risk being technologically outflanked, as adversaries deploy iterations faster than we approve initial designs.

• We become strategically predictable, enabling enemy planning based on static assumptions about U.S. capabilities.

• We lose tactical initiative, as cheaper, rapidly modified systems neutralize our most expensive platforms.

VI. Recommendations for Urgent Reform

1. Agile Procurement Units: Expand DARPA-style task forces within each branch for rapid prototyping and deployment.

2. Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Integration: Adapt civilian tech (e.g., consumer drones, AI software) where appropriate.

3. Performance-Based Contracting: Tie payments to deliverables, with enforceable penalties for schedule slippage.

4. Doctrine Realignment: Rewrite operational doctrine to embrace modular, autonomous, and networked systems.

5. Audit and Sunset Legacy Projects: Subject all programs over 5 years old to threat-based reassessment.

VII. Conclusion: The Trap Must Be Broken

America cannot afford to plan for yesterday's battles. The procurement trap—slow, politicized, and wasteful—must be dismantled before it disables the warfighter. The clock is ticking: the next war will not wait for the next RFP.