Fault Lines on the Durand Line: Why Pakistan and Afghanistan Are Fighting — and How It Could Be Contained

PAKISTAN AND AFGHAN WAR TURNS HOT

The Immediate Crisis

The latest round of fighting between Pakistan and Taliban-run Afghanistan marks the most serious escalation between the two neighbors since the U.S. withdrawal. Pakistan has conducted air and artillery strikes across the border, including near major Afghan cities. Kabul has responded with cross-border attacks and drone use. Both sides claim significant casualties. Civilian harm is alleged. Mediation attempts are underway.

What appears at first glance to be another border flare-up is, in fact, the collision of sovereignty, militant sanctuary, and regional power politics.

Root Causes: Why This Is Happening

1. The TTP Sanctuary Problem

Pakistan’s core grievance centers on the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad says operates from Afghan territory. The Afghan Taliban deny formal sponsorship but have struggled—or declined—to decisively suppress ideologically aligned militants.

For Pakistan, cross-border attacks are a sovereignty violation.For Kabul, cracking down on fellow Islamist factions risks internal legitimacy fractures.

This tension is structural, not episodic.

2. The Durand Line Dispute

The 2,611-kilometer border remains politically sensitive. Afghan governments—long before the Taliban—have resisted fully legitimizing the colonial-era boundary. Border fencing, troop deployments, and cross-border shelling periodically inflame Pashtun communities straddling both sides.

3. Pakistan’s Escalation Doctrine

Islamabad appears to have shifted toward more aggressive “kinetic” responses rather than containment. After repeated attacks inside Pakistan, its military signaled patience had expired.

This is deterrence by punishment rather than deterrence by warning.

4. Taliban State vs. Movement Dilemma

The Afghan Taliban now govern a fragile state. Governing requires border control and international credibility. Movement ideology, however, binds them to Islamist networks that transcend borders. The contradiction is now manifesting violently.

What We See on the Ground

• Concentrated clashes near Torkham and frontier districts.

• Artillery exchanges and drone activity.

• Competing casualty narratives.

• Civilian displacement risk.

• Diplomatic backchannels activated quickly.

This is not yet full-scale war—but it is more than symbolic skirmishing. The escalation ladder is being tested.

Who Should Mediate?

🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia: The Stability Lever

Saudi Arabia brings:

• Deep military ties with Pakistan.

• Religious legitimacy across the Sunni world.

• Strong U.S. security alignment.

• Financial incentives for reconstruction or stabilization.

• MBS’s desire for diplomatic prestige.

Riyadh can apply state-to-state pressure on Islamabad and frame de-escalation as responsible Islamic governance rather than capitulation.

A successful Saudi-hosted framework would strengthen a Western-aligned Sunni stabilizer.

🇹🇷 Turkiye: The Ideological Bridge

Turkiye brings:

• Credibility with Islamist actors.

• Military partnership with Pakistan.

• NATO membership (providing Western linkage).

• Experience in regional mediation.

Ankara can speak to Taliban leadership in language of Islamic solidarity while privately reinforcing non-harboring commitments.

Turkiye can engage the ideological channels; Saudi Arabia can engage the state channels.

Together, they create balance.

Why Not China?

China maintains a close strategic partnership with Pakistan through CPEC and defense ties. However:

• China historically avoids direct military escalation between nuclear actors.

• During India-Pakistan crises, Beijing offers diplomatic support but stops short of decisive intervention.

• China prefers controlled tension over unpredictable conflict.

Beijing’s interest is corridor stability—not moral arbitration.

China could attempt to:

• Position itself as indispensable mediator.

• Prevent Saudi or Turkish diplomatic prestige.

• Protect CPEC leverage.

But China’s recent history during India-Pakistan crises suggests its influence has ceilings. It reassures—but rarely risks escalation to enforce outcomes.

Pakistan likely understands those limits.

The Optimal Mediation Architecture

A dual-track system:

• Saudi Arabia → Incentives, legitimacy, Western alignment.

• Turkiye → Ideological access, Islamic credibility, NATO linkage.

This marginalizes:

• Iranian leverage.

• Russian opportunism.

• Chinese monopolization of influence.

It allows the U.S. to remain publicly restrained while shaping outcomes quietly.

Strategic Outlook

Best Case:

• Third-party monitored agreement.

• Mutual pledge against cross-border militant sanctuary.

• Gradual normalization.

Medium Risk:

• Periodic cross-border strikes become normalized.

• Low-grade conflict persists.

High Risk:

• Major mass-casualty attack triggers deeper strikes.

• Afghan internal fragmentation.

• Expanded regional involvement.

Conclusion

This conflict is not a “victimless” ideological clash. It is a sovereignty contest with regional implications. Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state; Afghanistan remains fragile. Militant sanctuary is the core accelerant.

If stabilization is the objective, mediation must combine:

• Religious legitimacy.

• State leverage.

• Western linkage.

• Ideological credibility.

Saudi Arabia and Turkiye together provide the most balanced architecture available.

China may attempt to protect its corridor interests, but history suggests Beijing prefers managed friction over decisive arbitration.

The window for de-escalation remains open—but only if the sanctuary question is confronted directly rather than deferred.