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DONALD OF ARABIA. WHATDO THE ARAB NATIONS DO NOW THAT "PEACE" HAS ARRIVED?

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HAS TRUMP DREAMED THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM OF MIDDLE EAST PEACE?


Forecasting the Political Trajectory of the “Westernized Arab Coalition” (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan) — 2025–2035

Executive Summary

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan—call them the “Westernized Arab coalition”—are navigating a difficult pivot: from rent-driven, security-anchored states toward performance-legitimacy, economic diversification, and more independent regional diplomacy. Their likely pathway over the next decade is a blend of managed modernization, tightly supervised political opening, and multipolar hedging, punctuated by periodic retrenchment if shocks hit (oil price swings, regional war, extremist attacks). Normalization with Israel remains bounded by Saudi preconditions around Palestinian statehood; Jordan continues its role as humanitarian and diplomatic bridge; the UAE leans further into high-visibility mediation and soft power. The National+4Al Arabiya English+4Al Arabiya English+4

1) Historical Foundations

Pre-oil order. Pre-hydrocarbon Arabia featured weak central institutions, tribal compacts, and religious legitimation (notably in the Hijaz). Jordan’s Hashemite kingdom, carved from post-Ottoman arrangements, entered the modern era as a small, aid-dependent state.

The rentier turn. Oil transformed state–society relations in Saudi Arabia and (later) the UAE. Hydrocarbon rents financed patronage, public employment, and extensive subsidies—dampening demands for taxation-linked accountability and enabling authoritarian resilience. Jordan, lacking oil, relied on Gulf transfers, discounted energy, and external aid to stabilize a thin fiscal base, particularly during commodity and refugee shocks. Arab Barometer

2) The Islamist/Extremist Challenge

Through the late 20th and early 21st centuries, regimes faced a two-level problem:

  • Organized Islamism (e.g., Brotherhood currents). Often service-provisioning and grassroots-embedded, these movements competed for moral legitimacy and sometimes political space; regimes alternated cooptation and crackdown.

  • Transnational jihadism (al-Qaeda/ISIS and affiliates). A persistent security threat that targeted Westerners, regimes, and later broader regional and global arenas.

States responded by tightening control over religious institutions, professionalizing counterterrorism, and shaping a “moderate” official discourse—while preserving the option for decisive repression when red lines were crossed. (For cross-references on terrorism finance debates around the Gulf, see U.S./UK congressional and Treasury materials.) U.S. Department of the Treasury+3State Department+3State Department+3


"Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is." T.E. LAWRENCE, 27 ARTICLES


3) Recent Realignments

3.1 Economic diversification and social opening

Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030—built on the pillars of a Vibrant Society, Thriving Economy, and Ambitious Nation—anchors the Kingdom’s non-oil transition (tourism, entertainment, culture, logistics, sports, technology) and requires calibrated social liberalization to attract capital and talent. The UAE has already operationalized a cosmopolitan, innovation-heavy model; Jordan seeks investment-led growth and corridor projects but remains constrained by high unemployment. Saudi Vision 2030+3Saudi Vision 2030+3Saudi Vision 2030+3

Jordan’s labor market stress. Despite modest improvements, unemployment remains structurally high (21.4–21.5% in 2024), with pronounced female and graduate joblessness—pressures that shape legitimacy and policy choices. Jordan Times+1

3.2 Diplomacy, normalization, and soft power

  • Saudi conditionality on normalization. Riyadh has repeatedly tied any Israel normalization to an independent Palestinian state and a credible peace process—positions reiterated through 2024–2025 by senior officials and outlets. Al Arabiya English+2Al Arabiya English+2

  • UAE as mediator/broker. Abu Dhabi has leveraged convening power and neutrality branding—facilitating repeated Russia–Ukraine POW exchanges in 2025, and projecting a distinctive Gulf mediation style. The National+1

  • Jordan as humanitarian/diplomatic bridge. Amman sustains an activist, pro-Palestine diplomacy—marrying humanitarian leadership with advocacy for a two-state framework and regional de-escalation. Jordan Times+1

Note on Sudan: Accusations that the UAE aided Sudan’s RSF are formally denied by Abu Dhabi and remain contested in international fora (ICJ filing; UN expert leaks), illustrating the reputational risks of regional activism. The Guardian+3Reuters+3Ministry of Foreign Affairs+3


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4) Contemporary Pressures & Trade-offs

  1. U.S. posture & transactional bargains. U.S. policy cycles (including 2025 Trump-led diplomacy around Gaza ceasefire/hostages) elevate Arab leaders to center stage but also force visible choices that carry domestic and regional costs. The Guardian+1

  2. Domestic legitimacy & youth expectations. Arab Barometer and allied studies capture persistent economic anxieties in Jordan (jobs, inflation, wages) that spill into governance expectations. The coalition’s stability increasingly hinges on performance legitimacy. Arab Barometer+1

  3. External threats & hedging. Iran and proxy networks, non-state militias, maritime threats, and great-power competition drive security autonomy and supplier diversification—even as U.S. ties remain foundational. (See The National’s coverage of Arab/Gulf diplomacy trends.) The National+1

5) Scenarios (2025–2035)

Scenario

What it looks like

Opportunities

Risks

A. Managed Modernization (Base Case)

Social–economic opening under tight political control; technocratic upgrades; curated civil space.

Job creation; investor confidence; soft-power gains.

Reform drag vs youth demand; oil volatility; elite pushback.

B. Conditional Liberalization

Controlled local representation, advisory councils; limited party competition; tightly bounded Islamist inclusion.

Legitimacy dividends; safety valves; policy feedback.

Pandora’s box: opposition momentum; institutional capture risks.

C. Securitarian Retrenchment

Shock triggers rollback of social opening; expanded surveillance/censorship.

Short-run stability.

Alienation/brain drain; reputational damage; investment flight.

D. Regional Projection

More assertive mediation/interventions; normalization choreography; Arab coordination forums.

Agenda-setting; leverage with great powers.

Overstretch; blowback (e.g., Sudan-style allegations). Reuters

Baseline forecast: A + selective B + hedging, with episodic C under shock, and cautious, issue-specific D.

6) Country Notes

Saudi Arabia

  • Vector: Vision 2030-driven diversification; high-profile global branding; conditional path to normalization (Palestinian statehood prerequisite). Saudi Vision 2030+1

  • Risks: Oil price downturns; mega-project under-delivery; conservative backlash; great-power turbulence.

United Arab Emirates

  • Vector: Cosmopolitan growth model; sovereign-led capital allocation; hyper-active mediation and convening (e.g., Russia–Ukraine POW swaps). The National+1

  • Risks: Reputational exposure where activism intersects conflicts (e.g., Sudan narratives); overextension.

Jordan

  • Vector: Diplomatic bridge and humanitarian hub; incremental governance tweaks; external-finance-dependent growth; persistent labor-market stress. Jordan Times

  • Risks: Aid fatigue; refugee spillovers; economic stagnation fueling unrest.

7) Reconciling Past, Present & Assigned Roles

  1. Narrative rebranding: “Arab-modernist guardians”—fusing cultural/religious legitimacy with competence and economic performance (a core Vision 2030 trope). Saudi Vision 2030+2Saudi Vision 2030+2

  2. Institutional layering: Add technocratic agencies, audit and regulatory capacity, and performance dashboards alongside legacy patronage networks—rather than shock-therapy replacement.

  3. Calibrated social opening: Tourism, entertainment, cultural policy, women’s participation expand—tempered by red lines around political contestation.

  4. Conditional normalization choreography: Progress tethered to Palestinian statehood (Saudi), with UAE/Jordan sustaining roles as mediators and humanitarian conduits. Al Arabiya English+1

8) Monitoring Dashboard (Update Quarterly)

Governance & Rule-making

  • New/updated statutes (media/NGO/judiciary/anti-corruption); enforcement visible?

  • Elite churn: conciliatory appointments vs purges.

Economy & Society

  • Youth and female unemployment (Jordan focus); FDI inflows; non-oil GDP share (KSA/UAE). Jordan Times

  • Tourism and services growth; cost-of-living indices.

Security & Extremism

  • Frequency/severity of attacks, maritime incidents, militia activity; arrest statistics (publicly reported).

Foreign Policy

  • Saudi statements tying normalization to Palestinian statehood; concrete steps around Gaza ceasefire phases; mediation outputs (e.g., UAE-brokered swaps). Al Arabiya English+2The Guardian+2

Public Opinion

  • Arab Barometer/Jordan-specific polling on economy, governance, normalization attitudes. Arab Barometer

9) Policy Implications

For the coalition states

  • Pace the reforms. Pilot → evaluate → scale; avoid credibility gaps from over-promising.

  • Build state capability. Independent(ish) regulators, meritocratic hiring, procurement transparency.

  • Own the narrative. Tie social opening and youth opportunity to national pride and religiously grounded moderation.

  • Buffer for shocks. Maintain sovereign wealth/liquidity, diversify suppliers and markets.

For Western partners

  • Conditioned cooperation. Link arms, investment, and tech partnerships to concrete institutional improvements—not maximalist overnight political change.

  • Backstop humanitarian and economic stabilization around Gaza and Jordan to prevent spillover shocks.

  • Respect hedging space while safeguarding core security cooperation.

10) Timelines & Waypoints (2025–2035)

  • 2025–2027: Social–economic opening deepens (Saudi/UAE); Jordan focuses on jobs and fiscal anchors. Gaza ceasefire/hostage phases test coalition’s diplomatic bandwidth; Saudi normalization remains conditional. The Guardian+1

  • 2028–2031: Limited, supervised political openings become plausible (local councils, consultative forums). UAE sustains mediator brand. Jordan’s reforms hinge on external financing and regional calm.

  • 2032–2035: Institutionalization (or retrenchment) contingent on shocks; generational leadership consolidation across all three states.

References (selected, indicative)

Appendix A — Snapshot Data Points (as of Oct 16, 2025)

  • Jordan unemployment: ~21.4–21.5% (2024/2025 reporting); female unemployment ~32.9%. Jordan Times

  • Saudi Vision 2030 pillars: Vibrant Society, Thriving Economy, Ambitious Nation. Saudi Vision 2030

  • Saudi normalization condition: Palestinian statehood prerequisite repeatedly affirmed 2024–2025. Al Arabiya English

  • UAE mediation: Multiple Russia–Ukraine POW swaps facilitated in 2025. The National

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