When Faith Becomes Political Infrastructure, the Public Purse Must Close
- lhpgop
- 1 hour ago
- 4 min read

JAMES 4:4 “Amicitia huius mundi inimica est Dei.
Quicumque ergo voluerit amicus esse saeculi huius, inimicus Dei constituitur.”
“Separation of church and state” has been flattened into a slogan about avoiding a national religion. That was never its sole purpose. At its core, the doctrine exists to prevent the state from subsidizing religious power as a political instrument—especially where public money underwrites conduct that collides with the enforcement of law.
That distinction matters now.
Across the United States, some religious organizations and clergy have moved beyond moral advocacy into operational interference with federal immigration enforcement, including physically blocking Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers. These actions are defended as faith-based witness. But they raise a question the law cannot continue to dodge:
Should organizations that obstruct federal law enforcement remain eligible to operate taxpayer-funded charities and receive government grants?
Free Exercise Is Not a Funding Entitlement
The First Amendment protects belief, worship, and speech. It does not guarantee access to government funds.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that government may impose neutral, conduct-based conditions on public funding without violating constitutional rights. In Regan v. Taxation With Representation, the Court held that Congress is not required to subsidize political activity through the tax code (461 U.S. 540, 545–46 (1983)). In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court reaffirmed that the government may decline to fund conduct it does not wish to promote—even when that conduct involves protected speech (500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)).
Losing eligibility for public funds is not censorship. It is accountability.
Speech Ends Where Obstruction Begins
Criticizing immigration law is protected speech. Advocating reform is protected speech. Protest—even loud and disruptive protest—is protected speech.
Physically obstructing federal officers is not.
Federal law criminalizes impeding federal officers in the performance of their duties (18 U.S.C. § 111). No violence is required; intentional interference suffices. Religious motivation does not create an exemption. The Supreme Court made this explicit in Employment Division v. Smith, holding that neutral laws of general applicability may be enforced even when they burden religious practice (494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)).
Churches are not embassies. “Sanctuary” has no legal status. Clerical garb confers no immunity from federal supremacy (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
Separation of Church and State Cuts Both Ways
If separation of church and state means anything in practice, it means that public funds should not empower religious institutions as political-operational actors.
The Establishment Clause exists to prevent excessive entanglement between government and religion (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)). Funding organizations that coordinate obstruction of federal law enforcement is entanglement in its most concrete form.
This is not a theological judgment. It is a governance one.
Risk, Not Guilt, Governs Public Funding
A critical distinction has been lost in the public debate: courts adjudicate criminal guilt; governments assess risk.
The absence of a judicial conviction does not imply the absence of facts. National-security clearances, contracting decisions, visa determinations, and grant eligibility all routinely turn on risk assessments, documented associations, and pattern analysis—not courtroom verdicts.
No one has a constitutional right to taxpayer funding. Public dollars demand a higher standard of trust than private advocacy.
Extremist Advocacy Is Not a Free Pass
The same principle applies to extremist advocacy framed as religious expression. The First Amendment protects belief and abstract speech, even when offensive. It does not protect material support, recruitment, coordination, or operational alignment with violent movements.
In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court drew the line at advocacy intended and likely to produce imminent lawless action (395 U.S. 444 (1969)). And in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court held that even non-violent “training” or “expert advice” coordinated with designated terrorist organizations falls outside First Amendment protection (561 U.S. 1 (2010)).
Organizations that tolerate or promote rhetoric which predictably functions as recruitment, facilitation, or justification for violence—whether framed as “jihad” or otherwise—cannot reasonably claim neutrality, nor should they expect continued access to public funds.
This is not religious discrimination. It is conduct-based scrutiny.
When Clerical Status Becomes Tactical Cover
Law enforcement agencies often exercise restraint when clergy physically interpose themselves in enforcement actions, knowing the optics of arresting a priest or nun can be weaponized. That restraint is humane—but it creates incentives.
Once religious identity becomes a tactical shield, obstruction spreads. Accountability erodes. The First Amendment does not protect conduct designed to exploit enforcement hesitation (United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)).
A Narrow, Constitutional Remedy
The solution need not be radical. It can be principled and lawful:
Organizations—religious or secular—that engage in coordinated obstruction of federal law enforcement, or that operate as political infrastructure aligned with extremist movements, should be ineligible for federal grants, contracts, and taxpayer-funded charitable programs.
Such a rule:
Targets conduct, not belief
Applies neutrally
Preserves free exercise and free speech
Respects federal supremacy
Protects the integrity of public funds
Faith communities remain free to preach, protest, and oppose federal policy. What they are not entitled to do is operate as taxpayer-funded political infrastructure while undermining the rule of law.
That is not persecution. It is constitutional accountability—and it is overdue.
Selected Legal Authorities
U.S. Const. amend. I
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)
18 U.S.C. § 111
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)




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