TOM COTTON'S BID TO DESTROY TULSI GABBARD?

TOM COTTON. A MASTER OF DECEPTION?

The Intelligence Clock Rewound: Why Senator Cotton’s Plan Signals a Return to Deep State Consolidation—and Why the DNI Must Survive or Be Balanced by the DIA

I. Executive Summary

Senator Tom Cotton’s proposed overhaul of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) is not simply a bureaucratic reform—it’s a strategic reversion to the pre-9/11 intelligence architecture. While some view it as a check on Tulsi Gabbard’s assertive use of the DNI platform, the deeper reality is that Cotton’s plan would restore institutional dominance to the FBI and CIA, agencies historically resistant to oversight and central coordination.

Director Gabbard’s declassification of politically sensitive materials only underscores the true value of the DNI role—not as a coordinator, but as a watchdog over the entrenched power structures of the Intelligence Community (IC). If Cotton’s dismantling of ODNI proceeds, the best course of action for preserving checks and balances would be to transfer counterintelligence functions to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)—not to the FBI or CIA, whose record of politicized operations demands independent counterbalance.

II. Background: The Post-9/11 Framework and Its Flaws

The 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) was designed to prevent the kinds of intelligence failures that led to 9/11. It created the ODNI, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) as oversight and coordination bodies.

But what was meant to decentralize and democratize intelligence access instead led to:

• Layered bureaucracy, not streamlined agility

• Cultural resistance from the FBI and CIA

• A false sense of oversight, where deep-state networks merely adapted to new governance without losing power

Despite ODNI’s creation, the FBI and CIA maintained core authorities and influence, using Congressional allies, bureaucratic stalling, and internal alliances to limit ODNI’s real reach.

III. Cotton’s Plan: Restoration, Not Reform

Cotton’s legislation proposes to:

• Cut ODNI personnel by 60%

• Eliminate key offices like NCSC and the Counterproliferation Center

• Reassign their missions to the FBI and CIA, respectively

While framed as a reform to eliminate redundancy, this maneuver restores pre-9/11 power to the two most entrenched—and historically abused—agencies in the U.S. government.

Not About Gabbard—About Control

Gabbard’s declassification of documents implicating Obama-era intelligence leaders demonstrates how powerful an independent DNI can be. Cotton’s move may not be aimed personally at her, but her effectiveness has revealed the DNI’s potential to disrupt entrenched narratives and expose misuse of power.

Thus, Gabbard has inadvertently proven why the DNI must exist—not as a middle manager, but as a check on agencies with histories of politicization and suppression.

IV. The Case for Preserving the DNI

Watchdog, Not Just Coordinator

• Coordination can be performed by interagency task forces, but only the DNI—with full community-wide visibility—can audit, declassify, and act as a public-facing check.

• Gabbard’s declassifications show that without an autonomous DNI, there is no internal balance—just agency fiefdoms and political loyalty tests.

Structural Implications of Removal

• Gutted ODNI = unchecked consolidation of investigative, counterintelligence, and analytical power into two agencies that already dominate domestic and foreign arenas

• Without the DNI, no office exists to challenge FBI misuse of FISA or CIA manipulation of foreign intel assessments

V. IF the DNI Must Be Dismantled: Send Counterintelligence to DIA

If Cotton’s bill succeeds and ODNI is neutered, then national counterintelligence (NCSC) must not be given to the FBI or CIA—it should be folded into the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for the following reasons:

1. DIA Offers Balance Without Political Entanglement

• DIA is military-focused, less culturally politicized than the FBI or CIA

• It answers to the Department of Defense, offering a different institutional interest base

• Its mission centers around external threats, reducing chances of politicized domestic abuse

2. DIA Can Act as a Check on Intelligence Overreach

• DIA's analytic independence and strategic posture make it a credible auditor and counterbalance

• It brings logistical infrastructure and HUMINT integration that could enhance national CI capability

3. Public Confidence

• Transferring CI to DIA, while not ideal, preserves the optics of accountability, unlike funneling more power to scandal-tainted agencies

VI. Conclusion

Tom Cotton’s intelligence overhaul is not a neutral reform—it is a structural rollback of oversight designed to reempower the twin pillars of the postwar surveillance state: the FBI and CIA. Whether or not Gabbard is his target, her leadership has proven the value of having an independent, empowered DNI.

Recommendation:

• Preserve the DNI with enhanced watchdog authority, including:

  • Classified document declassification powers

  • IG-level internal audit teams

  • Legal authority to halt interagency misconduct

• IF abolition proceeds, national counterintelligence must go to DIA, not the political organs of domestic or foreign policy intelligence.

The era of blind trust in secretive power centers is over. Cotton’s rollback must be stopped—or at the very least, restructured to avoid creating a two-agency deep state immune from democratic oversight.