THE DEATH OF EL MENCHO

EL MENCHO, THE HEAD OF THE JALISCO NEW GENERATION CARTEL HAS BEEN KILLED.

After-Action Report

Operation resulting in the death of CJNG leader Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes (“El Mencho”)

Area: Tapalpa, Jalisco (mountain/wooded terrain)Key dates: Feb 20–23, 2026Result: Target located, engaged, wounded, and died during evacuation; subsequent CJNG statewide/nationwide retaliatory actions.

1) Executive Summary

Mexican authorities located El Mencho by tracking a romantic partner and/or an intermediary who escorted her to a cabin/compound complex in Tapalpa. Mexican intelligence then confirmed he remained after she departed. A pre-dawn operation by Army special forces + National Guard, with airborne surveillance/support and U.S. intelligence assistance for confirmation/overwatch, attempted to capture him. The operation escalated into a sustained firefight involving CJNG security elements using high-powered weapons (including reports of rocket launchers). El Mencho fled into wooded terrain, was found wounded while hiding, and died during transfer toward higher-level medical care (reported as en route to Mexico City / hospital transfer).

Within hours, CJNG launched coordinated retaliation—mass roadblocks, vehicle arsons, attacks on infrastructure and security forces, disrupting travel and daily life across multiple states. Mexican officials attributed key retaliation coordination to a senior figure nicknamed “El Tuli,” later killed during follow-on operations.

2) What Triggered the Breakthrough: How El Mencho Was Found

2.1 Core locating mechanism (most consistently reported)

• Military intelligence surveillance tracked a romantic partner (or a trusted associate escorting her), leading to a Tapalpa location where she met El Mencho.

• After she left, intelligence indicated El Mencho remained, protected by a security ring at a cabin/compound complex.

2.2 Timeline markers reported by Mexican outlets/official briefings

Mexican reporting repeatedly anchors the chronology to:

• Feb 20: identification of the escort/associate and movement of the romantic partner to the Tapalpa site, meeting with Mencho.

• Feb 21: she departs; intelligence indicates Mencho stays behind with a security circle.

• Feb 22 (pre-dawn): assault/raid phase.

3) Operational Phase: The Attempted Arrest / Engagement

3.1 Forces and support (as described publicly)

• Mexican Army + National Guard formed the main action force, with elite/special elements mentioned in reporting.

• U.S. intelligence: described as “critical” for confirming position/overwatch; U.S. officials emphasized intelligence support rather than direct troop involvement.

3.2 Contact and escalation

• Reporting describes a rapid escalation once forces closed in: CJNG security engaged with heavy firepower, including claims of rocket launchers in the fight.

• Reuters’ “key events” summary indicates Mencho was injured during a pursuit into wooded terrain following the initial raid contact.

• Multiple accounts state he attempted to flee with close protection; two guards/bodyguards are repeatedly named as dying with him during evacuation.

3.3 Capture status: “captured” vs “killed in raid”

Public language varies:

• Some reports describe him as captured and then dying during transfer, emphasizing he was “in custody” but critically wounded.

• Others emphasize he was killed/abatido during/after the shootout.

Best synthesis: authorities gained physical control of him while he was critically wounded (or immediately after he was located), and he died en route to advanced care.

4) Death and Immediate Post-Engagement Actions

4.1 Death circumstances

• AP: found hiding in wooded area, wounded; died during transport with two guards.

• Reuters: injured during pursuit into wooded area; died en route to hospital.

4.2 Casualties (high-level, as publicly reported)

Casualty numbers differ by outlet and by whether the count includes the retaliation wave. Consistent points:

• Mexican officials reported significant National Guard fatalities (often cited as ~25) connected to the operation/retaliation period.

• “Dozens” of suspected cartel members were killed/arrested in follow-on engagements.

5) CJNG Retaliation: What Happened and Why

5.1 Observed retaliation pattern (confirmed/credible reporting)

Within hours of the announcement/realization of Mencho’s death:

• Mass roadblocks (“narcobloqueos”) using burned vehicles.

• Arson attacks (vehicles and, in some reporting, businesses/banks).

• Geographic spread: Jalisco the epicenter, with significant spillover to other states; El País and officials describe a wide multi-state footprint.

• Civil disruption: travel interruptions and public warnings/closures reported by major outlets.

5.2 Command-and-control of retaliation (reported attribution)

• Reuters and AP attribute a major role to a senior CJNG figure, “El Tuli,” including offers/bounties and coordination of blockades; he was later killed during follow-on actions.

5.3 Strategic purpose of retaliation (analysis)

CJNG’s response fits a classic cartel “show-of-force” logic:

• Internal discipline: prevent mid-level defections and keep cells aligned under the brand.

• Deterrence: raise the perceived cost to the state for future decapitation raids.

• Narrative control: communicate “we still govern terrain.”This aligns with the breadth and speed of the blockades/arsons documented.

6) Expected Next Actions from CJNG (Retaliation & Reorganization)

These are likely scenarios analysts and officials will watch for—framed as risk forecasting, not instruction:

6.1 Near-term (days to ~2 weeks)

1. Second-wave intimidationSelective attacks against local security forces, municipal targets, or symbolic disruptions—especially if authorities maintain pressure in Jalisco/Michoacán corridors.

2. Information operationsNarco-messages, videos, coerced displays of “normalcy under CJNG,” or threats to discourage cooperation with authorities.

3. Re-securing logisticsCJNG will focus on protecting money handlers, communications nodes, and trusted security coordinators after losing top leadership.

6.2 Mid-term (2 weeks to ~3 months)

1. Succession consolidationEither a single successor emerges (reducing violence) or a contested succession creates internal fragmentationand localized wars. Major outlets are already discussing successor monitoring and fragmentation risk.

2. Rival probingCompetitors will test CJNG control in contested states. If CJNG appears divided, external pressure increases.

3. Increased corruption pressureExpect intensified bribery/coercion of local officials to keep safe movement and safe houses intact—especially if federal operations expand.

6.3 What would reduce retaliation probability

Sustained arrests/seizures of mid-level operators (money, comms, weapons stockpiles) can blunt the cartel’s ability to coordinate state-spanning disruption—authorities have publicly framed ongoing detentions and normalization efforts along these lines.

7) Bottom Line Assessment

El Mencho’s death is a historic tactical hit on CJNG leadership. But Mexico’s cartel system is built to absorb decapitation through delegation and regional cells. The decisive question is whether the state can exploit the transition window to dismantle finance + logistics + mid-tier command, or whether CJNG stabilizes under a successor after a violent “recomposition.”