Pacific Strategic Intelligence WeeklyWeek Ending Sunday, October 25, 2026
Executive Assessment
This week’s Pacific developments revealed the early construction of a distributed maritime-security network around Taiwan. Taiwan’s Coast Guard is acquiring MARTAC Devil Ray T24 unmanned surface vessels under a U.S.–Taiwan co-production arrangement. The Philippines is exploring deeper cooperation with Taiwan to protect undersea cables and improve resistance to gray-zone interference. Japan and the United States began Keen Sword 27 with a strong focus on the southwestern islands, while Philippine forces joined elements of the exercise for the first time.
These are not separate procurement and exercise stories. Together they suggest an emerging “maritime mesh” linking coast guards, unmanned vessels, civilian sensors, undersea infrastructure, island-based missiles and allied information sharing.
China is developing the competing system. Taiwan’s Coast Guard said Beijing is coordinating maritime-militia fishing boats, coast-guard cutters and research vessels to expand “battlefield preparation” around Taiwan and into the western Pacific. Chinese vessels also pressed closer to Taiwan-controlled Pratas, while Beijing described its activities as lawful patrols intended to “safeguard order.” The strategic contest is therefore increasingly about which side can establish the more persistent network—and which interpretation of routine maritime order becomes accepted.
Typhoon Champi supplied a second test. The storm killed one person, injured more than 500, interrupted nearly 1,000 flights on Friday and temporarily cut power to more than 167,000 households. Yet most electricity was restored quickly and TSMC reported normal operations. Natural disruption is not identical to hostile coercion, but it reveals whether the same power, communications, transport and emergency systems possess operational resilience.
The week also produced an important critical-minerals milestone. The Marine Minerals Administration published a Final Leasing Notice for the first offshore-minerals lease sale near American Samoa, scheduling the auction for November 19. The process has now advanced beyond a proposed sale. The remaining questions concern qualified bidders, litigation, territorial consent, environmental safeguards, processing and local economic benefit.
Decision signal: The Pacific competition is becoming a contest between systems of persistence. The decisive capabilities will be those that can detect, communicate, repair, refuel, enforce and continue operating—during coercion, accident or extreme weather.
Strategic Indicators Dashboard
Arrows show the direction of change during this reporting week, not a value judgment. ► indicates no verified weekly change.
Indicator | Assessment at cutoff | Trend |
Regional military stability | Stable, but maritime friction is becoming more distributed | ▼ |
Chinese maritime pressure east of Taiwan | Taiwan now describes coordinated activity as expanded battlefield preparation | ▲ |
Pratas operating environment | Chinese coast-guard presence is pressing jurisdictional claims more directly | ▼ |
Taiwan Coast Guard modernization | Devil Ray T24 unmanned-vessel acquisition adds speed and persistence | ▲ |
Taiwan–Philippines maritime cooperation | Cable-protection discussions create a new practical channel | ▲ |
Allied southwestern-island posture | Keen Sword 27 integrates more partners and distributed systems | ▲ |
Taiwan infrastructure resilience | Champi caused major disruption, but power and chip production largely recovered | ▲ |
Taiwan commercial continuity | Aviation and public activity were heavily interrupted during the storm | ▼ |
Undersea-cable security | Cooperation is advancing, but no joint patrol or binding mechanism is confirmed | ▲ |
American Samoa seabed leasing | Final notice issued; auction scheduled for November 19 | ▲ |
CNMI seabed leasing | Governor-comment period closed; final notice and qualified bidders remain pending | ► |
Korean Peninsula stability | Border propaganda and military positioning worsen despite no new verified launch | ▼ |
China–North Korea economic connectivity | New Yalu River Bridge opened and trade signaling strengthened | ▲ |
Papua LNG readiness | No new financing or FID milestone verified | ► |
Commercial infrastructure opportunity | Strong, with integration and execution now more important than announcements | ▲ |
I. Featured Assessment
Building a Maritime Mesh Around Taiwan
The Taiwan Coast Guard Administration has signed an agreement to acquire an undisclosed number of MARTAC Devil Ray T24 unmanned surface vessels. The contract follows a 2025 memorandum among MARTAC, Taiwan’s Confucian Co. and the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology and includes co-production in Florida and Taiwan.
The T24 is an 8.4-meter craft with a beam of approximately three meters, a payload capacity of about 816 kilograms, burst speed above 50 knots and a reported cruising range of as much as 600 nautical miles. It can carry surveillance, communications or other modular payloads and can deploy smaller unmanned craft.
Those specifications are attractive, but the strategic value will depend on mission design. A fast unmanned vessel can extend surveillance, inspect contacts, relay data, patrol cable routes and place a low-cost platform in situations where sending a crewed cutter would create unnecessary risk. It can also become an expensive demonstration craft if it lacks secure communications, trained operators, maintenance, spare parts, common data standards and authority to act.
The acquisition fits Taiwan’s immediate problem. Beijing is using vessels whose identities span civilian, paramilitary, scientific and law-enforcement categories. A conventional military response to every fishing or coast-guard contact would be escalatory and unsustainable. Coast-guard USVs offer Taiwan a platform suited to persistent identification, documentation and presence below the threshold of naval combat.
Devil Ray T24 buildability test
Requirement | Present evidence | Proof still needed |
Platform capability | High speed, useful range and modular payload capacity | Performance in Taiwan’s sea states, weather and electronic environment |
Local production | U.S.–Taiwan co-production framework announced | Production location, Taiwanese content and delivery schedule |
Fleet scale | Agreement characterized as a major international USV purchase | Number ordered and deployable inventory |
Sensors | Platform can support surveillance and communications payloads | Selected radar, electro-optical, AIS and acoustic packages |
Network integration | Coast Guard requirement is clear | Secure links to cutters, aircraft, shore centers and defense forces |
Maintenance | Local partner is involved | Spares, technicians, depot repair and lifecycle cost |
Rules of use | Coast-guard employment lowers escalation risk | Authorities for warning, shadowing, evidence collection and intervention |
Survivability | Small, fast and unmanned | Resistance to jamming, spoofing, capture and cyber compromise |
The Philippine cable connection
The Philippines is separately exploring deeper cooperation with Taiwan on protection of undersea communications cables. A Philippine diplomat identified knowledge sharing and capacity building as possible areas, particularly around the Bashi Channel. No joint patrol or formal agreement was announced, and Manila continues to observe its one-China policy.
Even limited cooperation would matter. The waters between Luzon and Taiwan carry commercial shipping, military movement and dense communications infrastructure. Both governments face ambiguous incidents involving research vessels, fishing boats, coast guards and ships accused of suspicious activity near cable routes.
Cable security requires more than a patrol boat positioned above a charted line. It requires:
shared cable-route and repair information;
common standards for reporting suspicious loitering or anchor activity;
hydrographic and seabed awareness;
rapid access to repair ships and replacement cable;
legal evidence capable of supporting attribution;
secure exchange of sensitive commercial and government data; and
escalation procedures that distinguish accident, negligence and deliberate interference.
Taiwan’s civilian aerial patrols, new USVs, coast-guard cutters and shore sensors could become one layer of this system. Philippine surveillance around Batanes and Luzon could become another. Japan’s southwestern-island sensors and allied exercises add a third.
Keen Sword and the island chain
Keen Sword 27 began during the week with approximately 45,000 Japanese and 12,000 U.S. personnel. Seven partner nations participated in portions of the exercise, including the Philippines for the first time. The exercise includes island defense, amphibious operations, air and missile defense, mine clearing, intelligence, resupply and evacuation.
Systems displayed around the southwestern islands include Japan’s Type-25 long-range missile, U.S. NMESIS and MADIS systems, and HIMARS on Ishigaki. Typhoon Champi forced daily adjustments, which is itself a useful reminder that real-world operations must function around weather rather than according to an exercise script.
PACIFICA assessment: Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan and the United States are beginning to assemble complementary pieces of a distributed maritime network. The next test is integration. More sensors and platforms do not automatically produce a common operating picture, and a common picture does not automatically produce a timely, lawful response.
II. China’s Layered Maritime System
“Battlefield Preparation” Under Civilian and Law-Enforcement Cover
Taiwan’s Coast Guard formally confirmed that the suspected militia vessel Minfudingyu 07902 approached to about 2.7 nautical miles outside Taiwan’s restricted waters on August 16 while operating in the wider area of a Chinese coast-guard ship and research vessel. Taiwan dispatched a patrol boat, drove the fishing vessel away and placed it on a priority watchlist.
Taiwan now assesses that China is combining vessel types to expand “battlefield preparation” beyond the Taiwan Strait and into the western Pacific. The term should be treated as Taiwan’s assessment, not an independently proven mission order. Reuters reviewed surveillance evidence showing coordinated movement, but a single grouping does not reveal the complete operational plan.
The broader pattern is nevertheless strategically coherent:
Chinese platform | Immediate appearance | Potential contribution |
Maritime-militia fishing vessel | Civilian commercial activity | Persistent presence, observation, obstruction and deniable coordination |
Coast-guard cutter | Law enforcement | Jurisdictional assertion, inspection, exclusion and escalation control |
Research vessel | Scientific work | Hydrographic knowledge, seabed characterization and route preparation |
Naval aircraft and ships | Military readiness | Overwatch, deterrence and reinforcement |
Legal and information activity | Administrative governance | Normalization of Chinese claims and portrayal of resistance as disorder |
This system was visible around Pratas during the week. China said its coast guard was conducting lawful patrols to “safeguard order” around the Taiwan-controlled atoll after Chinese vessels approached and Taiwan used a water cannon against a Chinese fishing boat. Beijing threatened consequences and asserted sovereignty. Taipei warned that China may be attempting to exercise jurisdiction before achieving political control.
The distinction is central. If repeated patrols, warnings and inspections become treated as routine law enforcement, Beijing can change the operating environment without declaring a blockade. The countermeasure is not simply a larger warship. It is persistent evidence, calibrated enforcement and enough regional coordination that Chinese administrative claims do not become the only functioning system at sea.
III. Undersea Infrastructure
Cable Protection Moves from Technical Issue to Regional Strategy
The Philippine discussion of cooperation with Taiwan is significant precisely because it remains politically difficult. Formal defense cooperation would provoke Beijing and collide with Manila’s diplomatic recognition of China. Technical cooperation on cable resilience may offer a narrower, practical route.
The Bashi Channel is a strategic communications and maritime corridor between the Philippines and Taiwan. Damage to cables there could disrupt financial services, government communications, military awareness and ordinary internet traffic. Because cable failures can result from anchors, fishing activity, earthquakes or sabotage, attribution is often slow and contested.
Cable-security buildability screen
Requirement | Present stage | Proof still needed |
Political channel | Philippine officials acknowledge possible cooperation | Formal scope that remains compatible with Manila’s diplomatic policy |
Shared awareness | Both sides monitor gray-zone vessel activity | Secure exchange of tracks, alerts and seabed information |
Patrol capability | Aircraft, cutters and prospective USVs are available | Persistent coverage and coordinated tasking |
Repair capacity | Commercial cable operators maintain regional capability | Pre-arranged ships, spares, ports and response timelines |
Attribution | AIS, radar and imagery can preserve evidence | Common evidentiary standards and release procedures |
Deterrence | Public concern is increasing | Consequences for deliberate interference and protection during repair |
PACIFICA assessment: Cable protection may become the most practical first field for functional Taiwan–Philippines maritime cooperation. It addresses a shared vulnerability without requiring either side to announce a formal alliance.
IV. Taiwan Resilience
Typhoon Champi Provides a Non-Wartime Stress Test
Champi passed Taiwan after reaching super-typhoon strength earlier in its track. One person was killed and more than 500 injured. Almost 1,000 flights were cancelled on Friday and another 242 on Saturday. At the peak, more than 167,000 households lost power, though most service was restored rapidly.
TSMC said its operations continued normally. Taiwan’s high-speed rail remained operational, while other transport and public activity were reduced. Government evacuations, emergency equipment and military support were prepared before the storm’s closest approach.
The storm does not replicate blockade conditions. Repair crews were not operating under attack; fuel deliveries were not deliberately interdicted; communications were not being jammed; and replacement equipment could move through international supply chains. But Champi still offers measurable indicators:
speed of electrical restoration;
continuity of semiconductor production;
ability to move emergency personnel;
transport redundancy;
public-warning effectiveness;
port and airport recovery; and
coordination among civilian and military agencies.
PACIFICA assessment: Taiwan demonstrated substantial disaster resilience, especially in power restoration and semiconductor continuity. The heavy aviation disruption shows that commercial continuity remains more fragile than industrial continuity.
V. American Samoa
The Seabed-Minerals Sale Moves to a Firm Auction Date
The Marine Minerals Administration issued the Final Leasing Notice for American Samoa Pacific Mineral Lease Sale 1. The auction is scheduled for November 19, 2026. This is the first U.S. offshore-mineral lease sale of its kind near American Samoa and moves the process from proposed policy to an executable sale.
The final notice establishes the lease areas, auction procedures, stipulations and information for qualified bidders. Winning a lease would not authorize immediate commercial mining. Later exploration, testing and mining plans would still require approvals and environmental review.
The auction therefore answers only one question: whether qualified companies are willing to pay for exclusive access to investigate and pursue the resource.
American Samoa leasing: next proof points
Requirement | Present position | Proof still needed |
Federal process | Final Leasing Notice issued | Auction conducted and leases executed |
Market interest | Earlier unsolicited commercial request demonstrated interest | Number, identity and quality of qualified bidders |
Technology | Prospective lessees may propose deep-sea systems | Proven collection, lifting and environmental-monitoring capability |
Processing | Strategic rationale favors U.S. or allied chains | Named separation and refining plan outside Chinese dependence |
Local benefit | Lease stipulations can address participation | Jobs, port investment, training, revenue and enforceable commitments |
Environmental license | Federal assessment and stipulations completed for leasing stage | Baseline science and project-specific review before mining |
Legal durability | Final notice has been issued | Outcome of litigation and continued territorial acceptance |
Logistics | Pacific location is strategically valuable | Vessels, ports, repair, fuel, power and emergency response |
The central PACIFICA question now becomes bidder quality. A high auction price could signal interest but reveal little about execution. Each bidder should be examined for ownership, capital durability, collection technology, vessels, processing, customers, Chinese dependencies, environmental strategy and benefits promised to American Samoa.
PACIFICA assessment: American Samoa has crossed a procedural threshold that the CNMI process has not yet crossed. The November auction will be a market test, not a mining decision.
VI. Korean Peninsula
Border Pressure Rises as China–North Korea Trade Connectivity Improves
No new missile launch was independently verified during this reporting week, but tension continued to rise along the inter-Korean border. North Korea announced plans to activate anti-South propaganda loudspeakers across the border and repositioned tactical and firepower units while accusing Seoul of hostile warnings and gunfire.
At the same time, Kim Jong Un crossed the newly opened New Yalu River Bridge into Dandong, China. The three-kilometer link is expected to ease movement of raw materials, equipment and energy products and remove a longstanding trade bottleneck.
The combination matters. Pyongyang is hardening its political and military posture toward Seoul while improving its economic connection to China and maintaining military cooperation with Russia. Prospects for a Trump–Kim meeting around the November APEC summit appeared to recede during the week.
PACIFICA assessment: Deterrence remains intact, but North Korea is gaining room to reject immediate diplomacy. Improved Chinese trade access and Russian military cooperation reduce the cost of remaining confrontational.
VII. Standing Development Watch
CNMI seabed minerals
The October 19 deadline for the CNMI governor’s comments passed. No Final Leasing Notice or qualified-bidder list was verified by the cutoff. The proposed December 16 auction therefore remains conditional on the final federal process.
Papua LNG
No later-tier benefit settlement, binding finance package or final investment decision was verified this week. The project remains structurally improved but not yet sanctioned for construction.
Alaska LNG–Taiwan
No binding purchase agreement or committed Taiwanese equity investment was verified this week. Taiwan’s prospective six-million-tonne annual purchase remains a major expression of demand, not yet the bankable contract PACIFICA is watching for.
Majuro and Ebeye
The port program remains in funded planning. No construction award or capital package changed its stage this week.
VIII. Opportunities and Constraints
Opportunity | Present stage | Next proof point / principal constraint |
Taiwan Coast Guard USVs | Acquisition agreement signed | Fleet size, payloads, delivery, maintenance and network integration |
Taiwan–Philippines cable security | Cooperation publicly explored | Formal mechanism, data standards, patrols and repair arrangements |
Civilian and unmanned maritime surveillance | Multiple collection layers emerging | Persistent coverage and trusted common operating picture |
Southwestern-island defense | Keen Sword 27 demonstrates wider participation | Sustainable access, logistics and operational integration |
Taiwan disaster resilience | Champi showed rapid power recovery and chip continuity | Performance under prolonged, hostile disruption |
American Samoa seabed leasing | Final notice issued; November 19 auction scheduled | Qualified bidders, litigation, local benefit and processing plans |
CNMI seabed minerals | Proposed sale remains pending | Final notice and bidder qualification |
China–North Korea trade | New bridge improves physical connectivity | Actual trade volumes and sanctions implications |
Papua LNG | Provincial agreement remains in place | Later benefit tiers, finance, offtake and FID |
What to Watch Next
Devil Ray procurement: number of vessels, production split, sensor packages, delivery schedule and operational units.
Taiwan–Philippines cable cooperation: whether discussion produces a memorandum, shared exercises, patrols or repair arrangements.
Chinese activity east of Taiwan: repeat militia–coast-guard–research groupings and closer approaches to restricted waters.
Pratas: frequency and duration of Chinese coast-guard patrols and further Taiwanese enforcement.
Keen Sword 27: evidence of real sensor, logistics and command integration after weather disruptions.
American Samoa auction: qualified bidders, ownership, technology, financing, processing and local-benefit commitments.
CNMI final notice: whether the proposed December 16 auction remains achievable.
North Korea–China trade: traffic across the new bridge and any change in fuel, machinery or industrial flows.
Papua LNG: later benefit-sharing agreements and the approaching FID target.
Final Assessment
The Pacific’s emerging security architecture will not be defined by one dramatic platform. It will be defined by whether many modest capabilities can function as a coherent network.
Taiwan’s new unmanned vessels can extend coast-guard reach. Philippine sensors can improve awareness south of the island. Japanese and U.S. island-based systems can complicate hostile movement. Civilian aircraft can document ambiguous contacts. Cable operators can preserve communications. None is decisive alone.
China understands this systems competition. Its maritime militia, coast guard, research fleet, naval forces, legal claims and information operations reinforce one another. Each platform helps make the others appear more normal, more persistent and more difficult to challenge without escalation.
The allied answer must therefore be equally integrated but more transparent and legally credible. It must connect sensors to decision-makers, warnings to enforcement, damage to repair capacity and commercial infrastructure to national resilience.
American Samoa’s lease sale illustrates the same principle in economic security. Possessing seabed resources is not enough. Strategic value appears only when bidders, vessels, ports, processing, finance, environmental safeguards and territorial benefit become one buildable system.
That is the central assessment of this issue: the competition is no longer primarily over individual assets. It is over which side can assemble, sustain and legitimize the more effective network.
Source Notes
Naval News, “Taiwan Coast Guard to Acquire MARTAC Devil Ray T24 USVs,” October 19, 2026.
Reuters, “Typhoon Champi sweeps past Taiwan, one dead and 500 injured,” October 24, 2026.
Reuters, “North Korea to activate anti-South loudspeakers along border,” October 21, 2026.
Reuters, “North Korea’s Kim crosses new bridge into China as trade ties warm,” October 24, 2026.
About the Author
Frank J. Bell writes on maritime strategy, economic security, critical minerals, infrastructure and unconventional approaches to deterrence. His work has appeared in the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and the Middle East–Africa Forum (MENAF), and he is the author of Blue Web Doctrine: Maritime Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, available on Amazon.
For more information on events, projects and strategic trends shaping the Pacific Rim, subscribe to PACIFICA, published by the Blue Web Institute.
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