Modern-Day FlandersWhat We Should—and Should Not—Learn from the Drone War in Ukraine

WE SHOUD BE CAUTIOUS AS TO WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED FROM UKRAINE/RUSSIA CONFLICT

The war in Ukraine has become the world’s largest laboratory for military drone employment. Every week produces new footage of first-person-view drones pursuing vehicles, entering trenches, striking artillery positions and attacking individual soldiers.

These images are compelling. They are also dangerously easy to misinterpret.

Military planners increasingly cite Ukraine as evidence that inexpensive drones have permanently transformed warfare, rendered armored vehicles obsolete and made traditional maneuver nearly impossible. Fiber-optic drones, autonomous systems and mass-produced FPVs are presented as capabilities every modern military must adopt immediately.

There are important lessons here. Ukraine, however, is not the final word in drone warfare.

It is the leading case study in drone-supported positional warfare.

That distinction matters. The mature Russo-Ukrainian battlefield increasingly resembles a technologically updated version of Flanders: fortified lines, minefields, limited advances, artillery attrition and troops confined to positions the enemy has studied for months or years. Over this landscape now hangs a persistent web of aerial observation and attack.[1]

The drones are modern. Many of the underlying battlefield conditions are not.

Why Ukraine Is an Ideal Environment for Small Drones

The Ukrainian front is not completely motionless. Both sides conduct local attacks, infiltrations, withdrawals and incremental advances. Sustained dynamic maneuver and deep operational exploitation, however, have become comparatively rare.

Movement is generally constrained by:

• trenches and prepared defensive positions;

• extensive minefields;

• artillery coverage;

• predictable roads and treelines;

• established logistics routes;

• dense electronic warfare;

• persistent aerial observation;

• the absence of durable theater-wide air superiority.

These conditions magnify the effectiveness of short-range drones.

A drone team does not necessarily have to search an unfamiliar theater. It may already know which road supplies a particular trench, where vehicles enter a treeline, which buildings shelter personnel and when troops normally rotate through a position.

The drone watches a known engagement zone and waits.

This is especially advantageous for fiber-optic FPV drones. The aircraft receives commands and transmits video through a thin fiber-optic cable unwinding from a spool. This makes it resistant to conventional radio-frequency jamming and allows it to operate where normal command and video links may be unreliable.

It is an ingenious response to intense electronic warfare. It remains, however, a geographically constrained system with limited range, payload and endurance. The cable can snag, spool weight competes with warhead weight, and the launch point anchors the drone to a fixed tactical radius.[2]

That makes the fiber-optic FPV an excellent weapon for attacking vehicles traveling toward an established front. It does not prove that the same system will be equally effective against a rapidly moving combined-arms force whose location, direction, air-defense coverage and electronic-warfare boundaries change hourly.

Drones Help Create Stalemate—and Stalemate Helps Drones

Much of the current analysis assumes a one-way relationship: drones have made maneuver impossible, and therefore the war has become positional.

There is truth in that argument.

Persistent surveillance makes troop concentrations dangerous. Drones locate vehicles, artillery positions, command posts and logistics movements. Once a target is identified, it can be attacked by an FPV, artillery, a loitering munition or some combination of weapons. The interval between detection and engagement has contracted dramatically.[1]

But causation also runs in the opposite direction.

Because the front has become relatively static, short-range drones have become extraordinarily effective. Established positions create identifiable targets. Minefields channel vehicles into predictable routes. Repeated logistics movements create patterns. Troops cannot simply leave the engagement area when drone pressure becomes intolerable.

This produces a reinforcing cycle:

Persistent observation makes movement dangerous. Forces disperse and fortify. Fortification makes routes more predictable. Predictable movement makes short-range drones more effective. Their effectiveness makes movement still more dangerous.

Ukraine may therefore be demonstrating the culmination of a particular battlefield feedback loop—not the inevitable form of every future war.

The proper question is not simply whether drones helped produce the stalemate. It is also how much of their apparent dominance results from the stalemate already being present.

A Hit Is Not Necessarily a Kill

Drone footage creates another analytical distortion. A visible impact is frequently described as the destruction of a vehicle even when the recording does not establish what occurred afterward.

A drone strike can produce several different results:

• damage to cameras, antennas or external equipment;

• a broken track or wheel;

• engine damage;

• temporary loss of mobility;

• loss of a weapon or turret function;

• injury to a crew member;

• crew abandonment;

• internal fire;

• catastrophic ammunition detonation.

These are not equivalent outcomes.

Most small FPV drones carry limited explosive payloads. A shaped charge can penetrate a vulnerable point on an armored vehicle, particularly the roof, rear, engine deck, turret ring or an open hatch. Penetration, however, does not guarantee catastrophic destruction. A frontal or glancing impact may accomplish much less, while netting, cages, reactive armor, electronic warfare and active defenses further complicate the attack.

Many dramatic videos may show only the final stage of a much longer kill chain.

A vehicle might first strike a mine or receive artillery damage. Once immobilized, it is observed continuously and attacked by several drones. The crew eventually abandons it. Additional drones strike weak points until a fire or ammunition explosion occurs.

The published description then becomes: “A $1,000 drone destroyed a multimillion-dollar tank.”

The statement may be technically defensible, but it excludes the mine, reconnaissance system, artillery, unsuccessful drones, trained operators and logistical network required to produce the final result.

The meaningful measurement is not the price of the drone that created the visible explosion. It is the cost, reliability and sustainability of the complete reconnaissance-strike system.[3]

Moving Armor Presents a Different Problem

Now place the same drone against an armored formation conducting genuine dynamic maneuver under:

• friendly reconnaissance drones;

• mobile electronic warfare;

• layered counter-UAS defenses;

• artillery counterfire;

• infantry protection;

• smoke and deception;

• recovery and repair vehicles;

• attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft;

• localized air superiority.

The attacking FPV must first find the formation. It must reach the target before it moves beyond the drone’s operational radius, penetrate the defensive screen, maintain its control link, identify the correct vehicle and strike a vulnerable point while that vehicle is moving.

That is not impossible. It is considerably more difficult than attacking a stationary, damaged or repeatedly observed vehicle.

The armored formation will also be hunting the drone system. Its aircraft, artillery and reconnaissance assets can attack launch sites, relay stations, electronic-warfare vehicles, supply depots, operator positions and command nodes.

A sophisticated force should not attempt to intercept every inexpensive drone individually. It should attack the architecture that allows the enemy to find targets, coordinate missions, launch aircraft and replace its losses.

We do not yet possess a comparable body of combat evidence showing massed FPVs consistently stopping an integrated force while it retains air support, operational momentum and competent combined-arms protection.

Ukraine demonstrates what drones can do to armor operating inside a mature surveillance and interdiction zone. It does not conclusively demonstrate what they can do against sophisticated combined arms during a rapidly developing breakthrough.

The Missing Questions of Distance and Logistics

The Ukrainian battlefield is predominantly continental. Supplies can often move from factories and workshops through national road and rail networks to positions comparatively close to the front.

That model does not transfer neatly to the Indo-Pacific.

Pacific operations may involve hundreds or thousands of miles between manufacturing, storage, launch sites, ships, islands and intended targets. Every drone system must compete for cargo capacity with missiles, fuel, food, water, medical supplies and repair parts.

Increasing range generally requires more fuel or battery capacity. Increasing payload reduces endurance unless the aircraft becomes larger. Increasing range, payload and endurance together produces a more expensive, detectable and maintenance-intensive system.

At some point, the “cheap drone” begins acquiring the cost and logistical characteristics of a conventional aircraft or missile.

A serious drone assessment must therefore include:

• batteries and charging equipment;

• electrical generation and fuel;

• replacement motors, controllers and airframes;

• warhead assembly and safe storage;

• software and firmware support;

• radio-frequency management;

• communications relays;

• trained operators;

• repair technicians;

• transportation containers;

• environmental protection;

• losses during storage and transit.

The relevant figure is not merely unit price. It is the cost per confirmed military effect after communications, maintenance, personnel, transportation and unsuccessful sorties are included.

A drone that works brilliantly ten kilometers from a Ukrainian workshop may not offer the same value when it must be delivered to, supported from and operated across a contested archipelago.

The Psychological Weapon

The psychological effect on troops in static positions should not be understated.

Soldiers confined to trenches and bunkers may feel that every movement is being observed. Supply routes are watched. Casualty evacuation becomes dangerous. Vehicle noise can attract attention. A drone that does not attack may be directing artillery or studying the position for a later strike.

This creates a form of aerial siege.

The constant threat can disrupt sleep, suppress movement, delay resupply and damage morale. A drone need not kill anyone to influence the behavior of an entire position.

But this psychological dominance is also strengthened by the static environment. The soldier cannot leave, while the enemy has time to learn the position, its entrances, its routines and its weaknesses.

Drones will remain frightening in maneuver warfare, just as artillery, mines and aircraft have always been frightening. Their ability to produce paralysis, however, depends upon maintaining contact with a moving force and denying that force the ability to find and retaliate against the drone network.

This leads to another overlooked distinction: drones may be producing suppression more consistently than destruction.

Suppression is militarily valuable when artillery, armor or assault troops exploit it. If neither side can exploit the suppression, drones may reinforce the stalemate. Each force frightens and immobilizes the other without achieving decisive operational movement.

Ukraine’s Human Attrition Cannot Become the Western Model

There is also a political and moral limitation.

The United States and other sophisticated military powers should not design their future doctrine around accepting the scale and duration of personnel attrition seen in Ukraine. Although public tolerance will vary with the stakes and perceived necessity of a war, Western societies are unlikely to accept years of casualties incurred for incremental movement across a largely static front.

Nor should their military leaders normalize such an outcome if technological and operational alternatives exist.

Ukraine is adapting to a strategic predicament. Neither side has consistently suppressed the other’s surveillance, artillery, drones and electronic warfare. Ukraine must defend territory it cannot simply abandon, while Russia has demonstrated a willingness to expend substantial quantities of personnel and equipment.

Their innovations deserve close study and considerable respect. But a brilliant adaptation to strategic entrapment is not necessarily an ideal model for another military.

American unmanned doctrine should make machines attritable so that people do not have to be.

Drones should perform reconnaissance, deception, breaching support, resupply and attack missions that would otherwise expose personnel. They should help conventional forces reopen maneuver corridors and break the enemy’s reconnaissance-strike system.

They should not become instruments that merely make prolonged human attrition more technically efficient.

Drone-Centric Does Not Mean Drone-Exclusive

This caution does not negate the case for drone-centric maneuver.

In Blue Web Doctrine: Maritime Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, I place unmanned systems within a distributed maritime architecture based upon persistent sensing, elastic operational density, survivable communications, regeneration and progressive convergence.[7]

In my subsequent manuscript, “A Framework for Drone-Centric Maneuver,” I develop four principal drone functions:

• the forward screen;

• the adaptive barrage;

• the dynamic denial zone;

• the networked skirmisher.

In these roles, drones can harass, delay, fix, channel and place directional pressure on opposing forces. They can shape enemy movement and create opportunities for the larger force.[8]

But they do not eliminate the need to occupy terrain, secure populations, sustain logistics or make human command decisions. Their persistence remains conditional upon communications, navigation, survivable control nodes, operator capacity and continuous replacement.

Drone-centric warfare should therefore mean organizing the larger force around distributed sensing, rapid targeting, unmanned risk absorption and maneuver-shaping effects. It should not mean replacing the larger force with drones.

The objective is to use unmanned systems to restore and accelerate maneuver—not to make permanent stalemate more efficient.

What Modern Militaries Should Ask

Before translating a Ukrainian success into a procurement program, planners should ask:

• In what terrain and weather did the system succeed?

• Was the target moving, stationary or already disabled?

• How many drones were expended for each confirmed result?

• What external reconnaissance first located the target?

• What was the verified warhead effect?

• How often did jamming, mechanical failure or weather defeat the mission?

• How close were the operators to the front?

• Could the drone team keep pace with an advancing formation?

• What electrical power, batteries, spare parts and technicians were required?

• Could the system operate after losing GPS, satellite service and higher-level intelligence?

• Would it function across Indo-Pacific distances?

• Could it survive against sophisticated aircraft and electronic attack?

• Did it enable operational maneuver—or merely reinforce a stalemate?

These questions do not diminish the importance of drones. They distinguish demonstrated capability from technological enthusiasm.

The Right Lesson

Ukraine has proved that inexpensive drones can provide persistent reconnaissance, impose psychological pressure, punish exposed movement, assist conventional fires and attack vulnerable targets. No serious military can ignore these lessons.

But Ukraine has not proved that small drones can independently seize territory, sustain an advance, hold a population, establish air superiority or terminate a war. Nor has it proved that drones can replace the payload, protection, range and persistence of conventional forces.

The most accurate conclusion is also the most cautious:

The Russo-Ukrainian war is the definitive case study in drone-supported positional warfare. It is not the definitive model of drone warfare itself.

Modern militaries should study Ukraine urgently. They should learn how drones create transparent engagement zones, how electronic warfare drives rapid adaptation and how inexpensive systems can complement conventional weapons.

They must also recognize the danger of preparing to fight the next war as though every battlefield will be another Donbas.

Ukraine is teaching us what happens when neither side can destroy the other’s reconnaissance-strike complex and restore decisive maneuver. The ultimate Western lesson should not be how to reproduce that battlefield more efficiently.

It should be how to prevent a modern-day Flanders from forming at all.

Endnotes

[1] Maj. Mark K. Sauser, “Unmanned Aircraft and the Revolution in Operational Warfare: Preparing the U.S. Army for the Age of Unmanned Systems,” Military Review, July–August 2025.https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2025/Unmanned-Aircraft-Revolution/

[2] Col. Vytis Andreika, “Russia’s Changes in the Conduct of War Based on Lessons from Ukraine: Adapting Technology, Force Structures, and the Defense Industry,” Military Review, September–October 2025. Andreika discusses the short endurance and tactical range of FPVs, their vulnerability to electronic warfare and the introduction of fiber-optic systems to preserve control under heavy jamming.https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2025/Lessons-from-Ukraine/

[3] Lt. Col. Garrett M. Searle, “Tactical Reconnaissance Strike in Ukraine: A Mandate for the U.S. Army,” Infantry, Spring 2025, pp. 38–45. Searle describes tactical drones as components of a wider reconnaissance-strike system incorporating reconnaissance, precision fires, FPVs, maintenance, supply and battle-damage assessment.https://www.lineofdeparture.army.mil/Journals/Infantry/Infantry-Archive/Spring-2025/Tactical-Reconnaissance-Strike-in-Ukraine/

[4] U.S. Army, “Fiber Optic Drones: Posing a Significant C-UAS Challenge,” August 12, 2025.https://www.army.mil/article/287737/fiber_optic_drones_posing_a_significant_c_uas_challenge

[5] Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Feltey and Maj. Heath Rosendale, “Restoring Fires and Maneuver: An All-Arms Wave-Based Approach at the Tactical Edge,” Military Review, 2025. The authors place drones and loitering munitions within a layered combined-arms framework intended to suppress defenses, isolate formations and restore maneuver.https://www.armyupress.army.mil/journals/military-review/online-exclusive/2025-ole/restoring-fires-and-maneuver/

[6] Kathleen Hicks, “Unpacking the Replicator Initiative,” U.S. Department of Defense, September 6, 2023. Replicator was presented as a means of fielding attritable autonomous systems at scale to complement the full range of American military capabilities, particularly against anti-access and area-denial systems.https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3517213/deputy-secretary-of-defense-kathleen-hicks-remarks-unpacking-the-replicator-ini/

[7] Francis J. Bell, Blue Web Doctrine: Maritime Strategy for the Twenty-First Century (2026).

[8] Francis J. Bell, “A Framework for Drone-Centric Maneuver,” unpublished manuscript, 2026.