DID OBAMA OVERTHROW LIBYA? THE FIRST MOVE OF THE NWO CHESSGAME

OFF THE RECORD. ON THE QT AND VERY HUSH HUSH

From Oil Fields to Human Waves: How Libya’s Fall Unleashed a Controlled Chaos Against the West

Executive Summary

This white paper traces who benefits from Libya’s fractured oil sector and the parallel human-trafficking economy, and connects these outcomes to the 2011 NATO-led intervention under the Obama administration. Using Machiavellian, liberal‑internationalist, and geoeconomic lenses, we argue that Muammar Gaddafi’s removal was an intervention many Western actors had incentives to pursue, and that post‑war policy choices entrenched a model of managed instability that preserves oil flows while externalizing migration shocks onto Europe [1–6, 11–15, 18–22].

I. Who Benefits From Libya’s Oil Without a Central Government?

Libya’s oil today moves through three channels:1) Official NOC channel recognized by the UN, with proceeds routed to the Central Bank of Libya in Tripoli [1–3].2) A parallel eastern track aligned with the House of Representatives and the Libyan National Army (LNA), including private corporate wrappers such as Arkenu that have marketed crude independently since 2023 [4–6].3) An illicit smuggling economy (fuel and some crude), documented by UN panels and U.S. Treasury (OFAC), using shadow shipping, hawala, and cross‑border rings linking Libya–Malta–Italy–Egypt [7–10].

II. The Human Trafficking Overlay

Post‑2011, Libya became the core launchpad on the Central Mediterranean route to Italy and Malta. EU agencies and the IOM report recurring spikes in departures, tied to coastal control fragmentation and militia economics [11–13]. Western and eastern factions have each used departures as leverage in talks with European counterparts [11, 14].

III. Who Wanted Gaddafi Removed and Why?

Three frameworks converge on Gaddafi’s removal:• Machiavellian/Realpolitik: control over a migration chokepoint and high‑value light‑sweet crude needed by EU refineries [1–3, 11, 14–15].• Liberal‑Internationalist (R2P): the doctrine advanced by U.S. officials to justify force under UNSC Res. 1973 [16–17].• Geoeconomic/NWO: frustration of African monetary initiatives (e.g., gold‑linked concepts) and pan‑African investment that bypassed Western lenders (discussed in alternative sources) [23–26].

IV. Execution: The Clinton/Obama Spearhead

The coalition of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, UN Ambassador Susan Rice, and NSC official Samantha Power built the case for intervention around R2P; France’s Nicolas Sarkozy and the UK’s David Cameron supplied European political momentum; NATO’s command, under Admiral James Stavridis, executed Operation Unified Protector after UNSC authorization [16–17, 27–29].

V. The Migration Weaponization Hypothesis

Gaddafi warned EU counterparts that his fall would open migration floodgates; NATO/EU intelligence had long modeled Mediterranean flows; yet no postwar containment replaced Libyan coastal control. Instead, the EU transitioned to multi‑year “management” via EEAS funding, Frontex deployments, and IOM programs, entrenching reliance on fragmented Libyan actors [11–14, 30–31].

VI. Postwar Managed Instability

Post‑2011 policy avoided a blanket embargo on Libyan crude, sustaining European supply while allowing local power brokers to leverage ports and fields. Result: a durable split between official NOC liftings and gray/illicit flows; cyclical shut‑ins from the east; and persistent STS/shadow‑fleet practices in the central/eastern Mediterranean [1–6, 7–10, 14–15, 31–33].

VII. Strategic Hypothesis

The intervention established a template of controlled instability: remove an unreliable ruler; preserve oil flows through recognition of official channels; and externalize migration pressure as a political instrument within Europe. Intelligence collection on EU leaders provided leverage to keep policy alignment tight [27, 34–36].

VIII. Current Global Impact

• EU politics: sustained polarization over migration and burden‑sharing [11–13, 30–31].• NATO posture: permanentized maritime and ISR tasks in the Mediterranean [27–29, 31].• North Africa/Sahel: instability spillovers and militia economies [12, 14–15].• Oil markets: recurring Libya‑driven volatility with intermittent recoveries [1–3, 32–33].

Appendix A: Influence Pyramid Diagram

Appendix B: Network Diagram (Political → Military → Intelligence → Postwar Management)

Appendix C: Timeline of Key Events

• Feb 2011: Uprising and UNSC Res. 1970 (sanctions/ICC).• Mar 2011: UNSC Res. 1973 authorizes “all necessary measures”; NATO-led strikes begin (Operation Unified Protector).• Oct 2011: Gaddafi killed; OUP ends.• 2014–present: Dual governments and militia fragmentation; repeated oil shut‑ins.• 2015–present: Central Mediterranean route entrenched; EU shifts from prevention to management.

Endnotes and Source Appendix

Official / Primary Sources

[1] UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 (26 Feb 2011) and 1973 (17 Mar 2011).

[2] National Oil Corporation (NOC) — official statements and structure; CBL revenue routing (Tripoli).

[3] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA): Libya country analysis — production, disruptions, terminals.

[4] Reuters: reporting on Arkenu/private eastern liftings since 2023; correspondent banks involved.

[5] Financial Times: investigations into Libya’s illicit oil/fuel trade and militia economies.

[6] US Institute of Peace (USIP): governance and security updates on Libya (2024–2025).

[7] UN Panel of Experts on Libya: reports on fuel/crude smuggling networks and named entities.

[8] U.S. Treasury/OFAC (2018): sanctions against Libyan–Maltese–Italian fuel smuggling rings.

[9] EU Operation IRINI: public reporting on maritime monitoring and oil embargo enforcement tasks.

[10] NATO: Operation Unified Protector fact sheets and commander statements.

[11] Frontex: Central Mediterranean route statistics and risk analyses.

[12] International Organization for Migration (IOM): Libya migration data and displacement dashboards.

[13] European External Action Service (EEAS): programs financing Libyan coast‑guard training and migration management.

[14] House of Representatives/LNA communiqués on force‑majeure and port closures in eastern Libya.

[15] NOC bulletins on terminal shutdowns/reopenings; production figures by field/terminal.

[16] U.S. State Department/UN statements by Hillary Clinton and Susan Rice on R2P and Libya.

[17] Samantha Power, public remarks/writings on Responsibility to Protect and Libya 2011.

[18] IMF/World Bank country briefs and engagement notes regarding Libya (pre‑ and post‑2011).

[19] EU Council conclusions on Libya and migration (2011–2024).

[20] Allied Joint Force Command Naples public releases on Mediterranean operations.

[21] Central Bank of Libya publications on revenue distribution.

[22] Libya’s GNU/GNS public communiqués and ministry notices (as available).

[23] African Union communiqués and AU positions on Libya and continental monetary initiatives.

[24] Italy–Libya (2008) Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation — migration provisions.

[25] German Bundestag debates and positions around UNSCR 1973 (Germany’s abstention).

[26] UK & French parliamentary reports on Libya intervention (2016 UK Foreign Affairs Committee, etc.).

[27] NATO/SACEUR statements (Adm. James Stavridis) on OUP objectives and outcomes.

[28] SHAPE/JFC Naples operational summaries for OUP and subsequent Mediterranean missions.

[29] U.S. AFRICOM posture statements referencing North Africa and maritime security.

[30] IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reports on Libya, 2015–2025.

[31] EU Commission & Council documents on migration “hotspots,” training, and funding lines.

[32] OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin — Libya crude grades and capacity.

[33] Libya oil terminal corporate reports (Waha, AGOCO, Sirte Oil Co., Zueitina).

[34] European media/government disclosures on Merkel phone surveillance (post‑Snowden).

[35] NSA/SCS program reporting exposed in leaks; U.S. and German government responses.

[36] Press conferences and transcripts from 2011 leaders (Obama, Sarkozy, Cameron) framing the intervention.

Critical / Alternative Sources (contextual, investigative, or dissenting)

[A] UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2016): Libya—Examination of intervention and aftermath (critical).

[B] Investigative features in major European outlets (e.g., Der Spiegel, Le Monde) on migration leverage and EU divisions.

[C] Academic critiques of R2P’s application in Libya (International Security, Third World Quarterly, etc.).

[D] Analyses on African monetary initiatives and gold‑linked currency concepts attributed to Gaddafi (African policy forums; archival speeches).

[E] Maritime risk/insurance bulletins on shadow‑fleet/STSs in central Med (Lloyd’s List, industry circulars).

[F] NGO/think‑tank reports on militia financing via oil/fuel smuggling (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, etc.).